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Abstract:
Investors in financial markets face several restrictions apart from wealth
constraints. The first attempt to understand these restrictions in a general
competitive equilibrium framework can be traced back to Radner (1972). Here
these restrictions are assumed to be given exogenously, as first modeled by
Siconolfi (1986). Portfolio sets given by closed and convex sets containing zero
are the most general form of portfolio restrictions. Such sets can accommodate
most restrictions that investors actually face in financial markets, see Elsinger
and Summer (2000). The traditional Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium mod-
els can then be extended to a more realistic setting. Following Angeloni and
Cornet (2006), this extension of the Arrow-Debreu model in the multi-period
setting with restricted participation is established.
Once investors are assumed to face such portfolio restrictions, there is a
need to differentiate individual arbitrage opportunities from those at the ag-
gregate level. In the special case where the portfolio sets linear subspace (for
example investors invest only through some mutual funds) this difference in the
notion of arbitrage at the individual level and the aggregate level is character-
ized. Extending the 2-date result of Hens et al., we show that generically there
will be some arbitrage opportunities that remain unexploited at the aggregate
level.
The existence of a general financial equilibrium, an equilibrium in all mar-
kets (commodities and financial assets) has been extensively studied in 2-date,
multi-period and infinite horizon models. With such general portfolio con-
iii
straints, using an approach that dates back to Cass 1984, we look for arbitrage-
free asset prices at the aggregate level that are also equilibrium asset prices.
For this approach, we present a condition on the space of income transfers
which makes the existence result in this work very general and the previous
results in this area turn out to be special cases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The pioneering work of Arrow [4] and Debreu [19], [20] in the 1950s, has had
an enduring effect on the study of financial aspects of the economy in a general
equilibrium framework. One of their key contributions was to introduce time
and uncertainty into general equilibrium models with the use of a date-event
tree. In this set up commodities are available in each date-event (spot) and can
be traded at the initial date. A classic result of Arrow in this work was to show
that when sufficiently many Arrow securities (a contract that pays one unit of
account if a particular date-event occurs and nothing otherwise), can be traded
at the initial date-event, to transfer income across all spots, and commodities
are traded at each spot, then an equilibrium in such a financial economy is
equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in contingent commodities. The
inclusion of the financial aspects of the economy in this manner enables a more
realistic model where trade happens sequentially.
When sufficiently many financial assets (like Arrow securities) are available
so that all the agents are able to transfer income across all spots, then markets
are said to be complete. Incomplete markets is then the phenomenon where the
financial assets available for trade are not sufficient to transfer income across
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all spots and hence agents are limited in their risk sharing possibilities.
This observation that markets may be incomplete led to the development
of the growth in the literature on general equilibrium with incomplete markets
(GEI). One of the early contributions in this respect is that of Radner [58] in
1972. In Radners’ model, assets are contracts that promise to deliver one unit
of a contingent commodity upon the realization of a date event. On the one
hand, Radner shows that unlike the Arrow-Debreu models, the possibility of
trading commodity futures for every contingency is sufficient to enable income
transfers across all spots.
On the other hand, Radner also assumes that short-sales of these contracts
are limited for every agent. This assumption is a driving force in his proof of
the existence of a general financial equilibrium. This can be seen as the first
attempt to incorporate the idea that agents may be restricted in their asset
market participation.
However, Hart [44], used some disturbing yet insightful counter-examples
to demonstrate some of the weaknesses of Radner’s concept of equilibrium.
Firstly, he showed that existence of such an equilibrium cannot be proved under
the standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions. The reason for this non-existence
is, when the asset returns are price dependent, the market sub-space may
not be continuous in the spot prices which may lead to discontinuous demand
functions. This causes a failure of the existence of a Radner equilibrium. In the
case of incomplete markets an equilibrium may not be pareto optimal. Hence
the in these models a notion of Constrained Pareto Optimality is defined. In
addition, Hart in his 1975 paper, using a three date model, also showed that,
the intuition that, introducing more assets may lead to equilibrium that is
2
pareto superior, is false. Similar results were also obtained by Bhattacharya
[8] in a two date model.
Two possible ways emerged, to avoid such discontinuities in the demand
functions. The first was to restrict attention to assets for which the return
matrix cannot change rank. As for instance restricting attention to assets
that payoff in units of account (Cass [13], Werner [65]) or in a numeraire as-
set (Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis [34] and Magill and Shafer [51]). The second
approach involves, the techniques using differential topology, introduced by
Debreu [21] into economics. This has become the standard methodology to
demonstrate existence, constrained efficiency and indeterminacy of equilibria
in incomplete markets. In this approach, economies with general return struc-
tures are considered and the procedure involved is to show that the sets on
which the required properties do or do not hold, are negligible.
Cass [13] in his famous 1984 working paper published much later in 2006
[15], makes several important observations, two of which are directly related
to the work in this thesis. Firstly, Cass makes the following observation:
“... one of the most fascinating outcomes of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie
development of the solution to the equilibrium existence problem was the ex-
plicit recognition of the singular importance of some minimal commonality
between households. This specific aspect of my model deserves further serious
study (requiring subtle analysis of the interplay between endowments, prefer-
ences and financial opportunities.”
The second observation, to which this thesis attempts an answer, is related
to the case of restricted participation. Restricted Participation models are
those where, in addition to the usual budget constraints, each agent faces some
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financial constraints in term of the portfolio restrictions. Here Cass conjectures
that given that each agent is restricted to some subset of portfolios (closed,
convex and containing zero), if some agent is able to access all the portfolios
available to every other agent then existence is ensured.
Several contributions have been made in the literature to prove existence
of a general financial equilibrium in the case of incomplete markets, using the
two approaches mentioned above. In the two-date (one period) case the major
contributions include Cass ([13], [15]), Werner ([65], [66]), Magill and Shafer
([51] [52]) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [34], among others. Bich and
Cornet [9] have proved the existence of equilibrium in a two-date model when
agents may have non-transitive preferences.
1.1 Extensions to the Arrow-Debreu model
The multi-period extension of the GEI model requires a systematic treat-
ment of the evolution of time and uncertainty. Following Debreu’s [20] classic
work, Theory of Value, multi-period models have been posed in the event-
tree framework alluded to earlier. In this framework information unfolds over
time. Radner [58] formalized this model for a finite period setting. The book
by Magill and Quinzii [53] and the paper by Angeloni and Cornet [1] give a
good introduction to models in this framework. Existence of equilibrium in
the multi-period case was first proved by Duffie and Schafer [26]. Other ex-
istence results have followed since then, Florenzano and Gourdel [29], Levine
and Zame [49] and Monteiro and Pascoa [55], among others.
There have been several other extensions, departing from the implicit and
explicit assumptions of the Arrow-Debreu framework and the GEI models.
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The case of Asymmetric information in GEI models has been studied by Bois-
deffre and Cornet [10]. The possibility of default was introduced into these
class of models Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame[23], Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Shubik[22] and Zame[68]. Araujo, Pascoa and Orillo [2] and Araujo, Pascoa
and Martinez [3], have introduced collateral as an institution to prevent Ponzi
Games and preclude default.
1.2 Restricted participation
The extension that this thesis deals with, is that stemming from the com-
ments and observations in Cass’ 1984 working paper, the case of restricted
participation.
There have been two distinct approaches to incorporate restricted partic-
ipation into these models. The first approach assumes that these restrictions
arise due to institutional reasons and hence are part of the primitives of the
model. This would help to cover institutional details like, transactions costs,
short-sales constraints, margin requirements, collateral requirements, market
frictions due to bid-ask spreads and proportional taxes, capital adequacy re-
quirements and target ratios. Luttmer [50] and Elsinger and Summer [27]
describe how such institutional factors can be accommodated in the model by
assuming that agents have closed, convex portfolio sets containing zero.
Siconolfi [61]; Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6]; Benveneste and Ketterer
[7] and Polemarchakis and Siconolfi [57] consider linear restrictions on port-
folio sets. Cass, Siconolfi and Villinacci [16] and Villanacci et al. [63] work
with differentiable economies to study the nature of equilibrium. They con-
sider portfolio sets described by differentiable functions. Considering closed,
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convex portfolio sets containing zero would be the most general types of prim-
itive restrictions that can be considered. As mentioned earlier these types of
portfolio sets would help to cover a wide variety of institutional restrictions
mentioned earlier. Siconolfi [61] and more recently, Angeloni and Cornet [1];
DaRocha and Triki [54] and Hahn and Won [41] study the issue of existence
of equilibrium under such general portfolio restrictions.
The other, relatively less explored, approach is one where these portfolio
constraints are determined endogenously. Here each agents portfolio constraint
may depend on the equilibrium commodity prices and equilibrium asset prices
and other variables that will be determined at equilibrium. Carosi [11] and
Carosi and Villanacci [12] study these types of endogenous restrictions in a
differentiable economy.
1.3 The absence of arbitrage
The absence of arbitrage in financial markets is in essence the no free lunch
postulate. It is not possible to obtain something without giving up something
else. More formally, given asset prices and a set of possible portfolios does not
not offer arbitrage opportunities if it does not contain any portfolio that yields
non-negative net returns in any date-event and strictly positive net returns in
at least one date-event.
Models in which, there is no restricted participation, every agent’s portfolio
set is unconstrained and thus an asset prices that does not offer arbitrage
opportunities to the market as a whole will also deny arbitrage opportunities
to each individual agent and vice versa. However once, we impose the realistic
idea of constrained portfolio sets, this notion of absence of arbitrage at the
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aggregate level differ considerably from that at the individual level. Angeloni
and Cornet [1] give a definition of no-arbitrage at the aggregate level and at
the individual level. The notion of arbitrage and its absence in this thesis will
follow this definition.
Even without trading frictions like, short-sales constraints or transactions
costs, agents may restrict their attention to only a subset of assets. This can
be seen as arising due the fact the agent are limited in their attention span
and information processing capabilities. With these assumptions, in a two-
date model, Hens et al. [47] show that there is a considerable difference in
the arbitrage possibilities at the aggregate level as compared to those at the
individual level. In fact they show that at some asset prices, even if none of
the agents can find an arbitrage opportunities within their portfolio sets, there
may be some opportunities left unexploited at the aggregate (market) level.
The first contribution of this thesis, is to extend this result to the multi-period
(finite) case. This extension would require us to address two issues in particu-
lar. Firstly, the presence of long-lived in asset in the multi-period setting, gives
rise to the possibility of the deepening of mispricing which may make arbitrage
more expensive. This may naturally leave arbitrage opportunities unexploited
at the aggregate level. However in the rational expectations framework as-
sumed here, with no other market frictions, this possibility is supposed away.
The second issue, is to suitably modify the total returns matrix to allow for
frequent retrading of long-lived assets. This modification is done in a similar
spirit to Angeloni and Cornet [1].
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1.4 General financial equilibrium
Taking the constraints on individual portfolio sets as a primitive in the descrip-
tion of a consumer along with her initial endowments and preference relations,
we have a model of restricted participation with exogenous restricted partici-
pation. A general financial equilibrium in such a model is a list of consumption
allocations, portfolio allocations and commodity and asset prices at which (i)
each consumer chooses a consumption bundle and a portfolio to maximize her
preferences under her budget restrictions, (ii) commodity markets clear and
(iii) asset markets clear.
An interesting result arising from the paper by Cass [13] in 1984 which he
also recalls in the paper by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6], is that, with no
restricted participation, asset prices that do not offer arbitrage opportunities
at the aggregate level will also be equilibrium asset prices. This result has also
been explored by Duffie [24] and Florenzano and Gourdel [29]. More recently in
a working paper, Da-Rocha and Triki [54] have explored this characterization
with very general portfolio sets.
The existence proof of Cass [13] and Magill and Shafer [51] relies heavily
on the approach that has now come to be known as the ‘Cass Trick’ [15]. In
this approach one agent is assumed to be able to accommodate all the excess
demand in the asset market. In other words, this agent is assumed to be
unconstrained and hence behaves as in an Arrow-Debreu economy. Another
weaker assumption is that of Angeloni and Cornet [1], where one agent is
assumed to have zero in the interior of her portfolio set. This assumption is
again need for the use of the Cass Trick. More recently, Da-Rocha and Triki
[54] have outlined a procedure to avoid, this ad hoc assumption causing the
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treatment of agent’s constraints in an asymmetry manner. Hahn and Won
[41] also in a recent working paper prove existence without the use of the Cass
Trick, albiet with monotone preferences and a more involved notion of absence
of arbitrage.
The second major contribution of this thesis is to utilize the approach of
Da-Rocha and Triki [54], alluded to earlier, to prove the existence of a general
financial equilibrium. In this existence result consumers have very general
preference relations. In showing this characterization result of no-arbitrage
prices with equilibrium prices, a crucial assumption on the possibility of income
transfers in the aggregate level is needed. Here this condition is called the
transfer space condition. The result here differs from that of Da-Rocha and
Triki, as we suppose a more general notion of absence of arbitrage and more
general transfer space condition.
Chapter 2, outlines the general model of restricted asset market partici-
pation where the restrictions are given exogenously. Chapter 3 presents and
discusses the first main result of this thesis alluded to earlier in Section 1.3.
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the main existence result mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.4. This chapter also elucidates how many of the previous results in this
area can be obtained as corollaries of this central result. Chapter 5 concludes
this thesis and discusses some future directions for research.
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Chapter 2
The Model
2.1 Time and uncertainty
In order to describe a model of the multi-period financial exchange economy,
we need to begin with the evolution of time and uncertainty. Motivated by
the ideas in Chapter 7 of Debreu [20], the following model of time and uncer-
tainty is well known in the literature. For a detailed description see the two
equivalent formulations by Magill and Quinzii [53] and Angeloni and Cornet
[1]. The exposition here will follow the latter, which explicitly models the type
of restricted participation that is of interest in this thesis.
We1 consider a multiperiod exchange economy with (T+1) dates, t ∈ T :=
1In this paper, we shall use the following notations. A (D× J)−matrix A is an element
of RD×J, with entries (a(ξ, j))ξ∈D,j∈J; we denote by A(ξ) ∈ RJ the ξ−th row of A and
by A(j) ∈ RD the j−th column of A.We recall that the transpose of A is the unique
(J × D)−matrix tA satisfying (Ax) •D y = x •J (tAy), for every x ∈ RJ, y ∈ RD, where •D
[resp. •J] denotes the usual scalar product in RD [resp. RJ]. We shall denote by rankA the
rank of the matrix A. For every subsets D˜ ⊂ D and J˜ ⊂ J, the (D˜ × J˜)−sub-matrix of A
is the (D˜ × J˜)−matrix A˜ with entries a˜(ξ, j) = a(ξ, j) for every (ξ, j) ∈ D˜ × J˜. Let x, y be
in Rn; we shall use the notation x ≥ y (resp. x  y) if xh ≥ yh (resp. xh  yh) for every
h = 1, . . . , n and we let Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0}, Rn++ = {x ∈ Rn : x  0}. We shall also
10
{0, . . . ,T}, and a finite set of agents I = {1, ..., I}. The stochastic structure
of the model is described by a finite event-tree D of length T and we shall
essentially use the same model as Angeloni and Cornet [1], (we refer to [53] for
an equivalent presentation with information partitions). The set Dt denotes
the nodes (also called date-events) that could occur at date t and the family
(Dt)t∈T defines a partition of the set D; for each ξ ∈ D we denote by t(ξ) the
unique t ∈ T such that ξ ∈ Dt. Also we denote the cardinality of the set D
by D.
At each date t 6= T, there is an a priori uncertainty about which node
will prevail in the next date. There is a unique non-stochastic event occurring
at date t = 0, which is denoted ξ0, (or simply 0) so D0 = {ξ0} . Finally,
every ξ 6= ξ0 in the event-tree D has a unique predecessor denoted pr(ξ) in
D. The predecessor mapping pr : D \ {ξ0} −→ D satisfies pr(Dt) = Dt−1, for
every t 6= 0. The element pr(ξ) is called the immediate predecessor of ξ and is
also denoted ξ−. For each ξ ∈ D, we let ξ+ = {ξ¯ ∈ D : ξ = ξ¯−} be the set of
immediate successors of ξ; we notice that the set ξ+ is nonempty if and only
if ξ ∈ D \ DT .
Moreover, for τ ∈ T \ {0} and ξ ∈ D \ ⋃τ−1t=0 Dt we define, by induction,
prτ (ξ) = pr(prτ−1(ξ)) and we let the set of (not necessarily immediate) suc-
cessors and the set of predecessors of ξ be respectively defined by
D+(ξ) = {ξ′ ∈ D : ∃τ ∈ T \ {0} | ξ = prτ (ξ′)},
D−(ξ) = {ξ′ ∈ D : ∃τ ∈ T \ {0} | ξ′ = prτ (ξ)}.
use the notation x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y. We shall denote by ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean norm in
the different Euclidean spaces used in this paper and the closed ball centered at x ∈ RL of
radius r > 0 is denoted BL(x, r) := {y ∈ RL : ‖y − x‖ ≤ r}.
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If ξ′ ∈ D+(ξ) [resp. ξ′ ∈ D+(ξ) ∪ {ξ}], we shall also use the notation ξ′ > ξ
[resp. ξ′ ≥ ξ]. We notice that D+(ξ) is nonempty if and only if ξ 6∈ DT and
D−(ξ) is nonempty if and only if ξ 6= ξ0. Moreover, one has ξ′ ∈ D+(ξ) if and
only if ξ ∈ D−(ξ′) and similarly ξ′ ∈ ξ+ if and only if ξ = (ξ′)−.
2.1.1 The stochastic exchange economy
At each node ξ ∈ D, there is a spot market where a finite set H = {1, ...,H}
of divisible physical goods is available. We assume that each good does not
last for more than one period. In this model, a commodity is a couple (h, ξ)
of a physical good h ∈ H and a node ξ ∈ D at which it will be available, so
the commodity space is RL, where L = H × D. An element x in RL is called
a consumption, that is x = (x(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ RL, where x(ξ) = (x(h, ξ))h∈H ∈ RH,
for every ξ ∈ D.
We denote by p = (p(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ RL the vector of spot prices and p(ξ) =
(p(h, ξ))h∈H ∈ RH is called the spot price at node ξ. The spot price p(h, ξ) is
the price paid, at date t(ξ), for the delivery of one unit of the physical good h
at node ξ. Thus the value of the consumption x(ξ) at node ξ ∈ D (evaluated
in unit of account of node ξ) is
p(ξ) •H x(ξ) =
∑
h∈H
p(h, ξ)x(h, ξ).
Each agent i ∈ I is endowed with a consumption set X i ⊂ RL which is the set
of her possible consumptions. An allocation is an element x ∈ ∏i∈I X i, and
we denote by xi the consumption of agent i, that is the projection of x onto
X i.
The tastes of each consumer i ∈ I are represented by a strict preference
12
correspondence P i :
∏
j∈I X
j −→ X i, where P i(x) defines the set of consump-
tions that are strictly preferred by i to xi, that is, given the consumptions xj
for the other consumers j 6= i. Thus P i represents the tastes of consumer i but
also her behavior under time and uncertainty, in particular her impatience and
her attitude towards risk. If consumers’preferences are represented by utility
functions ui : X i −→ R, for every i ∈ I, the strict preference correspondence
is defined by P i(x) = {x¯i ∈ X i | ui(x¯i) > ui(xi)}.
Finally, at each node ξ ∈ D, every consumer i ∈ I has a node-endowment
ei(ξ) ∈ RH (contingent to the fact that ξ prevails) and we denote by ei = (ei(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ RL
her endowment vector across the different nodes. The exchange economy E
can thus be summarized by
E = [D;H; I; (X i, P i, ei)i∈I ].
2.1.2 The financial structure
We consider finitely many financial assets and we denote by J = {1, ..., J}
the set of assets. An asset j ∈ J is a contract, which is issued at a unique
node in D, denoted by ξ(j) and called the emission node of j. Each asset
j is bought (or sold) at its emission node ξ(j) and only yields payoffs at the
successor nodes ξ′ of ξ(j), that is, for ξ′ > ξ(j). We denote by v(ξ, j) the
payoff of asset j at node ξ. Since we consider only nominal assets this payoff
does not depend on the spot prices. For the sake of convenient notations, we
shall in fact consider the payoff of asset j at every node ξ ∈ D and assume
that it is zero if ξ is not a successor of the emission node ξ(j). Formally, we
assume that v(ξ, j) = 0 if ξ 6∈ D+(ξ(j)). With the above convention, we notice
that every asset has a zero payoff at the initial node, that is v(ξ0, j) = 0 for
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every j ∈ J . Furthermore, every asset j which is emitted at the terminal date
T has a zero payoff, that is, if ξ(j) ∈ DT , v(ξ, j) = 0 for every ξ ∈ D.
For every consumer i ∈ I, if zij > 0 [resp. zij < 0], then |zij| will denote the
quantity of asset j ∈ J bought [resp. sold] by agent i at the emission node
ξ(j). The vector zi = (zij)j∈J ∈ RJ is called the portfolio of agent i.
We assume that each consumer i ∈ I is endowed with a portfolio set
Zi ⊂ RJ, from which agent i is restricted to choose her portfolios.
The price of asset j is denoted by qj and we recall that it is paid at its
emission node ξ(j). We let q = (qj)j∈J ∈ RJ be the asset price (vector).
Definition 2.1.1 A financial asset structure
F = (J , (ξ(j), V j)j∈J , (Zi)i∈I)
consists of
- a set of assets J ,
- each asset j ∈ J is defined by a node of issue ξ(j) ∈ D and the vector of
payoffs across all nodes V j ∈ RD
- a collection of portfolio sets Zi ⊂ RJ for every agent i ∈ I,
The payoff matrix is given by the D × J matrix V = (v(ξ, j))ξ∈D,j∈J , and
satisfies the condition v(ξ, j) = 0 if ξ 6∈ D+(ξ(j)).
The full matrix of payoffs WF(q) is the (D× J)−matrix with entries
wF(q)(ξ, j) := v(ξ, j)− δξ,ξ(j)qj,
where δξ,ξ′ = 1 if ξ = ξ
′ and δξ,ξ′ = 0 otherwise.
So, for a given portfolio z ∈ RJ (and asset price q) the full flow of payoffs
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is WF(q)z and the (full) financial payoff at node ξ is
[WF(q)z](ξ) := WF(q, ξ) •J z =
∑
j∈J
v(ξ, j)zj −
∑
j∈J
δξ,ξ(j)qjzj
=
∑
{j∈J | ξ(j)<ξ}
v(ξ, j)zj −
∑
{j∈J | ξ(j)=ξ}
qjzj,
and we shall extensively use the fact that, for λ ∈ RD, and j ∈ J , one has:
[tWF(q)λ](j) =
∑
ξ∈D
λ(ξ)v(ξ, j)−
∑
ξ∈D
λ(ξ)δξ,ξ(j)
=
∑
ξ>ξ(j)
λ(ξ)v(ξ, j)− λ(ξ(j))qj. (2.1)
In the following, when the financial structure F remains fixed, while only
prices vary, we shall simply denote by W (q) the full matrix of payoffs. In the
case of unconstrained portfolios, namely Zi = RJ, for every i ∈ I, the financial
asset structure will be simply denoted by F = (J, (ξ(j), V j)j∈J ).
The model described above will be the basic framework in which all the
results and analysis of this thesis will be carried out. in Chapter 3 we consider a
special case of this model. The spot consumption choices are one dimensional,
H = 1, i.e. there is only one good (income) available for consumption at each
node. The spot price of this good is normalized to equal 1. Preferences are
given by a utility function that is strictly increasing and concave. On the
financial side, each agent is restricted to a subset of assets available in the
economy. This results in each agent’s portfolio set Zi being a strict subspace
of RJ. Chapter 4 on the other hand will consider the general version of this
model described above.
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2.2 Financial equilibrium
We now consider a financial exchange economy, which is defined as the cou-
ple of an exchange economy E and a financial structure F . It can thus be
summarized by
(E ,F) := [D,H, I, (X i, P i, ei)i∈I ;J , (ξ(j), V j)j∈J , (Zi)i∈I ].
Given the price (p, q) ∈ RL×RJ, the budget set of consumer i ∈ I, is the set 2
BiF(p, q) = {(xi, zi) ∈ X i×Zi : ∀ξ ∈ D, p(ξ)•H [xi(ξ)−ei(ξ)] ≤ [WF(q)zi](ξ)}
= {(xi, zi) ∈ X i × Zi : p (xi − ei) ≤ WF(q)zi}
When F is fixed we can drop the subscript F from the the payoff matrix W
and the budget set. We now introduce the equilibrium notion.
Definition 2.2.1 An equilibrium of the financial exchange economy (E ,F) is
a list of strategies and prices
(
x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯
) ∈ (RL)I × (RJ)I × RL \ {0} × RJ such
that
(a) for every i ∈ I, (x¯i, z¯i) maximizes the preferences P i in the budget set
BiF(p¯, q¯), in the sense that
(x¯i, z¯i) ∈ BiF(p¯, q¯) and [P i(x¯)× Zi] ∩BiF(p¯, q¯) = ∅;
(b)
∑
i∈I
x¯i =
∑
i∈I
ei and
(c)
∑
i∈I
z¯i = 0.
2For x = (x(ξ))ξ∈D, p = (p(ξ))ξ∈D in RL = RH×D (with x(ξ), p(ξ) in RH) we let p x =
(p(ξ) •H x(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ RD.
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Chapter 3
Restricted Participation and Arbitrage
In a two date (one period) model, Hens et al. [47] have shown that, generically,
when all investors are unable to participate in all financial markets simultane-
ously, there will be some arbitrage opportunities that are not exploited. We
explore the relevance of this result in a T -period model with long-lived assets.
Shleifer and Vishny [60] point out that in practice, arbitrage (trading based
on the knowledge that the price of an asset is different from its fundamental
value) is cheaper for mispriced short term assets than for mispriced long term
assets. Thus arbitrageurs would profit more by dealing in mispriced assets for
which the mispricing is eliminated in the near future. However they also point
out that with perfect capital markets arbitrageurs would not care about the
time it takes for a mispriced security to reach its fundamental value. This is
because with no transactions costs, absence of short sales, and without the
possibility of funds being tied up, the arbitrageur can sell off his risk at no
cost.
We consider a general financial model with the possibility of retrading
all assets at every period and every contingency. In this model short sales
constraints and transaction costs do not exist. Agents would not have costs
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associated with tied up funds and thus not care about the time it takes for the
mispricing to be eliminated. However as in Hens et al. agents are restricted in
the different types of assets they can trade in. This could be for reasons such
as a bound on information processing capabilities of the agents.
Most results in the two date model carry through in a straightforward
manner to the T-period models with short-lived assets. However this intuition
is not immediately clear for the above mentioned result in Hens et al.. The
natural extension of their result would be that, generically, if at all nodes, all
agents were not able to participate in all asset markets simultaneously, then
there may be some arbitrage opportunities that are left unexploited. The
precise statement is given in Proposition 3.2.3. However, it is possible that at
some nodes some agents are able to participate in all markets, and still there
may exist some arbitrage opportunities that are not exploited. Example 3.2.1
illustrates this point. With long-lived assets, when re-trading is allowed we
can consider a re-trading extension similar in spirit to that in Angeloni and
Cornet [1], which helps us to obtain the more general result with T -periods
and possibly long-lived assets.
Section 3.1 describes the T-period model, the financial structure with long-
lived assets along with its re-trading extension and the investor’s problem.
Section 3.2 characterizes the no-arbitrage conditions with restricted participa-
tion and states the central theorem of this paper. We also explain how our
result is more general than the natural extension of Hens et al. result with
short-lived assets. We conclude with the proof of the main theorem.
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3.1 The model: Special case
The model in this chapter is a special case of the model in Chapter 2. The flow
of time and uncertainty is exactly as described in Chapter 2. The differences
are in the specification of the exchange economy and the financial structure.
Some of the notations will be repeated only to ensure that the set up of the
model flows evenly.
3.1.1 The financial structure
There is a finite set J = {1, ..., J} of nominal assets available to transfer
income across the different nodes. Each asset j ∈ J is issued at some unique
non-terminal node ξ ∈ D− denoted ξ(j). Each asset yields returns only in
the nodes succeeding its node of issue. If an asset yields payoffs only in the
nodes immediately succeeding the node of issue, it is called a short-lived asset.
Otherwise it is called a long lived asset. The payoffs are described by the
D× J matrix V with entries v(ξ, j), representing the payoff of asset j at node
ξ. Note that the payoffs at nodes preceding the node of issue will be zero. The
financial structure is then denoted by F = (J , (ξ(j))j∈J, V ).
The re-trading extension: Given a financial structure
F = (J , (ξ(j))j∈J, V )
assets can also be re-traded at any node succeeding the node of issue. For any
node ξ ∈ D− we let J (ξ) denote the set of assets actively traded at node ξ
and J(ξ) its cardinality. This could include assets issued for the first time at
this node or assets issued prior to this node and re-traded at this node. Let
Jˆ = ⋃ξ∈D− J (ξ). We will be considering subsets of assets, J ⊂ Jˆ , which
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can also be written as J =
⋃
ξ∈D− J(ξ) where J(ξ) ⊂ J (ξ). Let Jˆ denote
the cardinality of Jˆ . We assume Jˆ ≤ #D+, to allow for possibly incomplete
markets.
Suppose asset j issued at node ξ(j) is re-traded at some node ξ′ > ξ(j). We
can treat this as a new asset jˆ = (j, ξ′) with the issue node ξ′, i.e. ξ(jˆ) = ξ′.
The payoffs from this asset is given by:
vˆ(ξ, jˆ) := vˆ(ξ, (j, ξ′)) = v(ξ, j), if ξ > ξ′
= 0 otherwise
The payoff matrix for this re-trading extension is now given by the D× Jˆ
matrix Vˆ . Thus, given a financial structure F = (J , (ξ(j))j∈J, V ) we can
obtain the re-trading extension Fˆ = (Jˆ , (ξ(j))j∈Jˆ , Vˆ ).
The re-trading extension outlined in Angeloni and Cornet [1], was obtained
by considering the re-trading of every asset in all the nodes. Hence Jˆ = DJ
and Vˆ was a D×DJ matrix. However, the exposition here is easier if we let Jˆ
contain only the assets that are actively traded.
The asset prices in this re-trading extension are then given by q = (q(ξ))ξ∈D− =
((qj)j∈J(ξ))ξ∈D− ∈ RJˆ. Let Vˆ denote the set of all D× Jˆ matrices. Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ
and q ∈ RJˆ we can define the D × Jˆ total payoff matrix W (Vˆ , q) with the
following entries:
w(Vˆ , q)(ξ, j) := vˆ(ξ, j)− δξ,ξ(j)qj,
where δξ,ξ′ = 1 if ξ = ξ
′ and δξ,ξ′ = 0 otherwise.
Let z ∈ RJˆ. Then for each element zj, we have j ∈ J (ξ) for some ξ ∈ D−
and we can interpret, zj > 0 [resp. zj < 0], as the quantity of asset j ∈ Jˆ
bought [resp. sold] at the trading node ξ. Thus a vector z = (zj)j∈Jˆ ∈ RJˆ
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is called a portfolio. So, for a given portfolio z ∈ RJˆ (and given asset price
vector q) the full flow of payoffs in this re-trading extension is W (Vˆ , q)z and
the (full) financial payoff at node ξ is
[W (Vˆ , q)z](ξ) := W (Vˆ , q)(ξ) · z =
∑
j∈Jˆ
vˆ(ξ, j)zj −
∑
j∈Jˆ
δξ,ξ(j)qjzj
We will occasionally need to consider the payoffs from a portfolio z as the
following sum:
Vˆ z =
∑
ξ∈D−
Vˆ (J (ξ))z(ξ)
Where Vˆ (J (ξ)) is the D×J(ξ) sub-matrix of Vˆ with the columns corresponding
to j ∈ J (ξ).
3.1.2 The investor’s problem
Each investor i ∈ I is endowed with an initial income stream ei ∈ RD+ and a
strictly increasing utility function ui : RD+ → R over the set of possible income
streams. Note that here the spot consumption choice is one dimensional, in
the framework of the basic model in Chapter 2, H = 1, and thus L = D.
The spot price of this good is normalized to equal 1. Investors are thus only
interested in the incomes they can obtain in each spot. Each investor has
the possibility of participating in the asset markets to transfer income across
nodes. However we assume that each investor has limited ability in making
such transfers. This limitation is imposed on the set of assets that the investor
is able to trade in. Thus each investor i has access only to a subset of assets,
Ji ⊂ Jˆ . The portfolio set of agent i is then a subspace of RJˆ.
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Investor i’s optimization problem is then given as:
max
(x,z)∈B(Vˆ ,q)
U i(x)
where
B(Vˆ , q) = {(x, z) ∈ RD+ × RJˆ | x− ei ≤ W (Vˆ , q)z, ∀ j /∈ Ji, zj = 0}
3.2 No-arbitrage condition with restricted participation
Definition 3.2.1 NACJ : Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ , q ∈ RJˆ and J ⊂ Jˆ , we say there are
no arbitrage opportunities in the J markets if the following holds:
@z ∈ RJˆ, with zj = 0, ∀ j /∈ J, such that W (Vˆ , q)z > 0
It is a standard result that NACJ holds if and only if q ∈ Q(Vˆ , J), where
Q(Vˆ , J) := {q ∈ RJˆ | ∃λ ∈ RD++ such that ∀j ∈ J, λ(ξ(j))qj =
∑
ξ′>ξ(j)
λ(ξ′)vˆ(ξ′, j)}.
Remark 3.2.1 The following are evident form this definition:
1. For i ∈ I, the assets available are Ji. Setting J = Ji in the above
definition we can say that agent i has no arbitrage opportunities if and
only if q ∈ Q(Vˆ , Ji).
2. Setting J = Jˆ in the above definition we can say that there are no
arbitrage opportunities in all markets if and only if q ∈ Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ). Notice
that we can write
Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = {q ∈ RJˆ | ∃λ ∈ RD++ such that tW (Vˆ , q)λ = 0}.
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Proposition 3.2.1 Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ the following are evident:
1. J ⊂ J ′ ⇒ Q(Vˆ , J ′) ⊂ Q(Vˆ , J).
2. Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) ⊂ Q(Vˆ ,⋃i∈IJi) ⊂ ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji).
3. If there exists i0 ∈ I such that Ji0 = Jˆ then Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) =
⋂
i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji).
Proof.
1. This fact is easy to see from the definition of Q(Vˆ , J).
2.
⋃
i∈IJi ⊂ Jˆ , thus we have the first inclusion. For all i ∈ I, Ji ⊂
⋃
i∈IJi
implies, for all i ∈ I,Q(Vˆ ,⋃i∈IJi) ⊂ Q(Vˆ , Ji). Thus Q(Vˆ ,⋃i∈IJi) ⊂⋂
i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji)
3. It is obvious that Q(Vˆ ,J ) ⊂ ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji) always. If q ∈ ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji)
then for all i ∈ I, q ∈ Q(Vˆ , Ji). In particular q ∈ Q(Vˆ , Ji0) = Q(Vˆ , Jˆ )
since Ji0 = Jˆ .
Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ and J ⊂ Jˆ , define
Z(Vˆ , J) := {z ∈ RJˆ | zj = 0, ∀ j /∈ J, and Vˆ z ≥ 0}
Lemma 3.2.1 Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ and J ⊂ Jˆ we have the following1:
1. Q(Vˆ , J) is a convex cone.
2. Q⊕(Vˆ , J) ⊂ Z(Vˆ , J)
1Given A ⊂ Rn define the positive polar cone to A by A⊕ := {x ∈ Rn | a ·x ≥ 0 ∀ a ∈ A}.
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Proof. We will set up the proof using the following definitions. Let Vˆ ∈ Vˆ
and J ⊂ Jˆ .
• No-arbitrage prices at trading nodes (NAC(J, ξ)): ∀ ξ ∈ D− define
Q(Vˆ , J, ξ) = {q(ξ) ∈ R#J(ξ) | ∃pi ∈ R#D+(ξ)++ such that
qj(ξ) =
∑
ξ′>ξ
pi(ξ′)vˆ(ξ′, j)),∀ j ∈ J(ξ)}
• Using Farkas’ lemma we can conclude that:
Q⊕(Vˆ , J, ξ) = {z(ξ) ∈ R#J (ξ) | zj = 0 ∀ j /∈ J(ξ), Vˆ (J(ξ))z(ξ) ≥ 0}
• We can also define the following:
Q˜(Vˆ , J, ξ) := {q ∈ RJˆ | q(ξ) ∈ Q(Vˆ , J, ξ)}
• Using Farkas’ lemma again, we see that
Q˜⊕(Vˆ , J, ξ) = {z ∈ R#J(ξ) | zj = 0 ∀ j /∈ J(ξ), Vˆ z ≥ 0}
1. Note that Q(Vˆ , J) = ∏ξ∈D− Q(Vˆ , J, ξ) and thus a convex cone. To see
this equality one inclusion is straight forward, if q is a no-arbitrage price
then q(ξ) is a no-arbitrage price for all ξ ∈ D−. To see the reverse
inclusion, let q ∈ ∏ξ∈D− Q(Vˆ , J, ξ). Then for all ξ ∈ D−,∃piξ ∈ R#D+(ξ)++
such that (NAC(J, ξ)) holds. Let λ(ξ0) = 1 and for all ξ ∈ D+ let
λ(ξ) = λ(ξ−)piξ
−
(ξ). Then q ∈ Q(Vˆ , J) with the associated λ defined
above.
2. Note that Q(Vˆ , J) = ∏ξ∈D− Q(Vˆ , J, ξ) = ⋂ξ∈D− Q˜(Vˆ , J, ξ). So
Q⊕(Vˆ , J) = (
⋂
ξ∈D−
Q˜(Vˆ , J, ξ))⊕ =
∑
ξ∈D−
Q˜⊕(Vˆ , J, ξ).
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The last equality is obtained by applying corollary 16.4.2 in Rockafellar
(1997) [59]. Finally, note that∑
ξ∈D− Q˜⊕(Vˆ , J, ξ) ⊂ Z(Vˆ , J)).
Lets define the set of matrices for which there is some portfolio yielding
non-negative payoffs in every future state by,
Vˆ+ = {Vˆ ∈ Vˆ | ∃z ∈ RJˆ \ {0} such that Vˆ z ≥ 0}.
The following proposition states that matrices outside of Vˆ+ are hardly inter-
esting.
Proposition 3.2.2 It holds that Vˆ /∈ Vˆ+ =⇒ Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = RJˆ.
Proof. Vˆ /∈ V+ ⇔ Z(V, Jˆ ) = {0} ⇒ cl Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = RJˆ.2 However since
Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) is a convex cone we have: RJˆ = ri (RJˆ) = ri (cl (Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ))) =
ri (Q(Vˆ , Jˆ )) ⊂ Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) ⊂ cl (Q(Vˆ , Jˆ )) ⊂ RJˆ. Thus we have RJˆ = Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ).
3.2.1 The main theorem
The following theorem is the main result of this paper. Note that Hens et al.
[47] implicitly assume that
⋃
i∈IJi = Jˆ . Which is reasonable because, if none
of the agents are able to trade in a certain asset at any node, then we can
eliminate that asset from the list and call the remaining list of assets as Jˆ . In
what follows we will also assume that
⋃
i∈IJi = Jˆ .
2Given A ⊂ Rn, cl (A) (resp. ri (A)) is the closure of (resp. relative interior) of A.
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Theorem 3.2.1 Suppose for all investors i ∈ I it holds that Ji 6= Jˆ . Then
there exists an open subset Vˆ∗+ of the set Vˆ+ with Vˆ+ \ Vˆ∗+ having Lebesgue
measure zero such that Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) 6= ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji) for all Vˆ ∈ Vˆ∗+.
Before entering the proof of this theorem we make the following observa-
tions. In the case of only short-lived assets, the result of Hens et al. can
be extended in a natural way to prove the following proposition, the proof of
which is given in the appendix.
Proposition 3.2.3 Suppose all assets are short-lived and for all nodes ξ ∈ D−
and for all investors i ∈ I it holds that Ji(ξ) 6= J (ξ). Then there exists an
open subset Vˆ∗+ of the set Vˆ+ with Vˆ+ \ Vˆ∗+ having Lebesgue measure zero such
that Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) 6= ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji) for all Vˆ ∈ Vˆ∗+.
Remark 3.2.2 Notice that Theorem 3.2.1 is more general than the natural
extension of the Hens et al. result in Proposition 3.2.3. In the T > 1 case
it is possible that Ji 6= Jˆ and for all ξ ∈ D− there exists i ∈ I such that
Ji(ξ) = J (ξ). See the example 3.2.1.
Example 3.2.1 Suppose all assets are short-lived. Let I = {1, 2, 3} and
T = 2. Let the date event tree be given by D = {ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4, ξ5, ξ6}, ξ+0 =
{ξ1, ξ2}, ξ+1 = {ξ3, ξ4}, ξ+2 = {ξ5, ξ6}.
Let the set of assets be J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with J (ξ0) = {1, 2},J (ξ1) =
{3, 4},J (ξ2) = {5} and the participation structure be given by J1 = {2, 3, 4, 5},
J2 = {1, 2, 4, 5} and J3 = {1, 3}. Then ∀ξ ∈ D−, ∃ i ∈ I such that Ji(ξ) =
J (ξ) however ∀ i ∈ I, Ji 6= J .
Theorem 3.2.1 is more general than the natural extension of the Hens et
al. result and includes the case of long-lived assets.
26
3.2.2 Proof of main theorem
The set up for the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 is done through the following lemmas.
For z 6= 0, denote < z >:= {αz | α ≥ 0}, the half-line spanned by the
vector z. Given Vˆ ∈ Vˆ denote by T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) the set of z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) such that
< z > is an extreme ray of Z(Vˆ , Jˆ )3.
Lemma 3.2.2 Let Vˆ ∈ Vˆ+ with rank Vˆ = Jˆ. Then we have the following:
1. Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = cc {z ∈ T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) | ||z|| = 1}4.
2. Let z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) \ {0}. Then z ∈ T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) ⇐⇒ rank {Vˆ (ξ) | ξ ∈
D(z)} = Jˆ− 1, where D(z) := {ξ ∈ D | Vˆ (ξ) · z = 0}.
Proof.
1. Since Vˆ ∈ Vˆ+ and rank (Vˆ ) = Jˆ,∃z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) \ {0} and Z(Vˆ , Jˆ )
contains no lines. By corollary 18.5.2 Rockafellar (1997)[59] we have the
result.
2. The proof follows easily from Proposition 3.3.2 Florenzano et al. [30].
Lemma 3.2.3 Let Vˆ ∈ Vˆ+ with rank (Vˆ ) = Jˆ. Then the following are equiv-
alent:
1. Q(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = ⋂i∈IQ(Vˆ , Ji)
3Given C ⊂ Rn a convex cone, and x ∈ C \{0}. < x > is an extreme ray of C if and only
if every line segment with a relative interior point in < z > has both end points in < z >.
4Given A ⊂ Rn, cc (A) is the convex cone generated by the vectors in A.
27
2. Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = ∑i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji)
3. T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) ⊂ ⋃i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji)
Proof. (1)⇔ (2) :
Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) = (
⋂
i∈I
Q(Vˆ , Ji))⊕ = (
⋂
i∈I
Q⊕⊕(Vˆ , Ji))⊕ = (
∑
i∈I
Z(Vˆ , Ji))⊕⊕ =
∑
i∈I
Z(Vˆ , Ji)
Using (1) and Lemma 3.2.1 we have the first equality. The third equality is
due to corollary 16.4.2 Rockafellar 1997 [59].
(2) ⇒ (3) : Let z ∈ T (Vˆ , Jˆ ), then z 6= 0 and z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ). By (2),
for all i ∈ I there exists zi ∈ Z(Vˆ , Ji) such that z =
∑
i∈Iz
i. Since z 6=
0,∃i0 ∈ I such that zi0 6= 0 in the above summation. Notice that the segment
[2zi0 , 2
∑
i∈I\{i0}zi ] contains z in its relative interior. Since < z > is an extreme
ray of Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ), both end points of the segment belong to < z >. So there
exists t > 0 such that 2zi0 = tz. Thus z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Ji0) ⊂
⋃
i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji).
(3) ⇒ (2) : ∑i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji) ⊂ Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) is obvious. T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) generates
Z(Vˆ , Jˆ ) and⋃i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji) generates∑i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji). ThusZ(Vˆ , Jˆ ) ⊂∑i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji).
Lemma 3.2.4 Suppose that Ji 6= Jˆ for all i ∈ I. Then there exists an open
subset Vˆ ′ of Vˆ with Vˆ \ Vˆ ′ having Lebesgue measure zero such that for all
Vˆ ∈ Vˆ ′ ∩ Vˆ+,
T (Vˆ , Jˆ )⋂(⋃i∈IZ(Vˆ , Ji)) = ∅.
Proof. For every j ∈ Jˆ and for every subset M ⊂ D with cardinality Jˆ− 1,
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define the function FjM : Vˆ × RJˆ → RJˆ+1 as follows,
FjM(Vˆ , z) =

Vˆ ξ · z, ξ ∈M
z · z − 1
zj
 .
Define the sets VˆjM as
VˆjM =
{
Vˆ ∈ Vˆ | there is no z ∈ RJˆ such that FjM(Vˆ , z) = 0
}
.
To see that VˆjM is open, let Vˆ(n) be the sequence of matrices in Vˆ \ VˆjM
converging to some Vˆ ∈ Vˆ . Then there exists a sequence z(n) in RJˆ such that
FjM(Vˆ(n), z(n)) = 0 for all n. Since the sequence z(n) is bounded, it has a
convergent subsequence converging to some z ∈ RJˆ. Hence, FjM(Vˆ , z) = 0,
and the matrix Vˆ belongs to the complement of the set VˆjM .
It is clear that for all (Vˆ , z) ∈ F−1jM(0) the matrix of the partial derivatives
has full row rank. That is, FjM is transversal to zero. The Transversality
Theorem implies that the complement of the set VˆjM has Lebesgue measure
zero.
Define Vˆ ′ as the set of matrices with rank Jˆ in the intersection of all sets
VˆjM . Then Vˆ ′ is open and its complement has Lebesgue measure zero.
Let Vˆ ∈ Vˆ ′ ∩ Vˆ+ and z ∈ T (Vˆ , Jˆ ). Suppose that z ∈ Z(Vˆ , Ji) for some
i ∈ I. Then zj = 0 for every j ∈ Jˆ \Ji. Lemma 3.2.2 implies that there is
a subset M of the set D with cardinality Jˆ − 1 such that Vˆ (ξ) · z = 0 for all
ξ ∈ M . Therefore, FjM(Vˆ , z) = 0 for every j ∈ Jˆ \ Ji, a contradiction to
Vˆ ∈ Vˆ ′. Thus, we have proved that T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) ∩ Z(Vˆ , Ji) = ∅ for all i ∈ I and
Vˆ ∈ Vˆ ′ ∩ Vˆ+.
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Proof. of Theorem 3.2.1
Define Vˆ∗+ to be the set of matrices with rank Jˆ in Vˆ+ ∩ Vˆ ′. Since Vˆ ′ and
the set of matrices with rank Jˆ are open in Vˆ+, Vˆ∗+ is open in Vˆ+. Also since
Vˆ ′ and the set of matrices with rank Jˆ have full Lebesgue measure, the set
Vˆ+ \ Vˆ∗+ has Lebesgue measure zero. By Lemma 3.2.4, for all Vˆ ∈ Vˆ∗+, T (Vˆ , Jˆ )
is nonempty, however for all i ∈ I, T (Vˆ , Jˆ ) ∩ Z(Vˆ , Ji) = ∅. Thus by Lemma
3.2.3 we have
⋂
i∈IQ(Vˆ , Jˆ ) 6= Q(Vˆ , Ji).
3.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
With only short-lived assets, we have J = Jˆ and thus V = Vˆ . Before we
begin the proof of Proposition 3.2.3, we introduce the following notations for
each ξ ∈ D−:
1. V(ξ) is the set of #ξ+ ×#J (ξ) matrices
2. z(ξ) and q(ξ) are vectors in R#J (ξ)
3. V+(ξ) := {V (ξ) | ∃z(ξ) 6= 0 such that V (ξ)z(ξ) ≥ 0}
4. Let µξ(resp. µ) represent the Lebesgue measure on V(ξ)(resp. V)
5. Q(V (ξ), J(ξ)) := {q(ξ) | ∃λ ∈ R#ξ+++ such that ∀ j ∈ J(ξ), qj =
∑
σ∈ξ+λ(σ)v(σ, j)}
where J(ξ) ⊂ J (ξ).
We now make the following observations:5
1. V = ⊕ξ∈D−V(ξ) = {V = ⊕ξ∈D−V (ξ) | V (ξ) ∈ V(ξ)}
5Given matrices An of dimensions ln × mn for n = 1, ..., N , the direct sum matrix is
denoted ⊕n∈{1,...,N}An = A1 ⊕ ...⊕AN which is of dimension
∑N
n=1 ln ×
∑N
n=1mn.
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2. V+ =
⊕
ξ∈D−V+(ξ) = {V = ⊕ξ∈D−V (ξ) | V (ξ) ∈ V+(ξ)}
3. Given V ′ ⊂ V , µ is now naturally defined by µ(V ′) = Πξ∈D−µξ(V ′(ξ))
Proof of Proposition 3.2.3
If for all ξ ∈ D− and for all i ∈ I, Ji(ξ) 6= J (ξ) then for all ξ ∈ D− there
exists an open subset V∗+(ξ) ⊂ V+(ξ) with full Lebesgue measure such that
Q(V (ξ),J (ξ)) 6= ⋂i∈IQ(V (ξ), Ji(ξ)) for all V (ξ) ∈ V∗+(ξ). This is due to the
Hens et al. result.
Notice that V∗+ =
⊕
ξ∈D−V∗+(ξ) is an open subset of V+. Let V = ⊕ξ∈D−V (ξ) ∈
V+ \ V∗+. Since for all ξ ∈ D−,V∗+(ξ) is open, there exists a sequence Vn(ξ) in
V+(ξ)\V∗+(ξ) converging to V (ξ) ∈ V+(ξ)\V∗+(ξ). Thus there exists a sequence
Vn in V+ \ V∗+ converging to V ∈ V+ \ V∗+. Thus V∗+ is open.
Also, notice that since for each ξ ∈ D−,V+(ξ)\V∗+(ξ) has Lebesgue measure
zero. Thus the set V+ \ V∗+ has Lebesgue measure zero.
Since for all ξ ∈ D− and for all V (ξ) ∈ V∗+(ξ),Q(V (ξ),J (ξ)) 6=
⋂
i∈IQ(V (ξ), Ji(ξ))
we have for all V ∈ V∗+,Q(V,J ) 6=
⋂
i∈IQ(V, Ji).
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Chapter 4
Equilibria with Restricted Participation
Investors facing restrictions on the portfolios that they can trade, is more of
a norm than an exception. We consider a model in which investors’ portfolio
sets are constrained. As in Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6] these constraints
are exogenously given (probably arising due to some institutional reasons).
Moreover, we consider very general restrictions on portfolio sets as in Siconolfi
[61], where each agents portfolios set is assumed to be convex and containing
zero.
This paper primarily examines the existence of a financial equilibrium in
a multiperiod model when investors face such general portfolio restrictions.
In two date (one period) models without restrictions on portfolio sets, the
existence issue has been extensively studied. Cass ([13]) and Werner ([65],
[67]) showed existence with nominal assets. Duffie and Shafer ([26]) showed a
generic existence result with real assets. This second approach has been exten-
sively used. Magill and Shafer [52] provide a good survey of financial markets
equilibria and contingent markets equilibria. Another approach to prove ex-
istence in a differentiable economy is to show existence in a numeraire asset
economy and infer the existence in the nominal asset economy (See Villanacci
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et al. Villanacci et al and Magill and Quinzii [53]).
Multiperiod models are better equipped to capture the evolution of time
and uncertainty and are a necessary step before studying infinite horizon mod-
els. Following Debreu’s [20] pioneering model we consider an event-tree to
represent the evolution of time and uncertainty. Magill and Quinzii ([53]) and
Angeloni and Cornet ([1]) are great references for the treatment of multiperiod
financial models. Each node in the event tree represents a date event. Given
information on asset prices and spot prices at all date events, consumers will
choose a consumption and a portfolio of assets (assumed to be constrained
here), such that the node specific value of the consumption does not exceed
the node specific value of their endowments and the net returns from the
portfolio.
In the absence of such portfolio restrictions the notion of absence of arbi-
trage is clear - if there is no portfolio that yields nonnegative net returns in all
nodes and strictly positive returns in some node. However in the case where
all agents face restrictions in their asset market participation, the notion of
arbitrage and its absence at the individual level may differ from that at the
aggregate level. Angeloni and Cornet [1] make this distinction. Given asset
prices a portfolio for an agent does not offer arbitrage opportunities if she
cannot find another portfolio within her constrained portfolio set that yields a
higher net payoff returns in all nodes and strictly positive payoff in some node.
On the other hand, there are no arbitrage opportunities in the aggregate, if
there is no portfolio in the set of pooled portfolio sets of all agents that yields
nonnegative net payoffs in all nodes and strictly positive payoff in some node.
At an equilibrium there must be no arbitrage at the individual level. A
33
natural question then is will any asset price at which there is no arbitrage
be an equilibrium asset price. The objective of this paper is to explore this
characterization under general portfolio constraints.
In the absence of portfolio constraints, Cass ([13]), Duffie ([24]) and Floren-
zano and Gourdel ([29]) show this characterization of equilibrium and arbitrage
free asset prices. In the presence of such constraints, the approach initiated by
Cass ([13]), where one agent has an unconstrained portfolio set, facilitates the
existence proof. This approach has been extensively used to show existence,
Magill and Shafer ([52]), Florenzano and Gourdel ([29]), Magill and Quinzii
([53]), Angeloni and Cornet ([1]) among others.
This approach of Cass ([13]), breaks the symmetry of the problem and
hence it is not possible to give a symmetric proof of existence (symmetric
with respect to the agents’ problem). More recently in a working paper, with
such general portfolio restrictions, Da-Rocha and Triki ([54]) have been able to
show the characterization between equilibrium and arbitrage free asset prices
without the use of the Cass approach. Hahn and Won ([41]), are also able
to show this albeit with monotonic preferences and more involved notion of
“Projective” arbitrage. However the notion of arbitrage and its absence in
these two papers differ from each other and from the notion considered in this
paper, that of Angeloni and Cornet ([1]).
In this paper we explore this characterization issue by showing that any
market arbitrage free asset price can be supported as an equilibrium asset
price. The approach here is similar to that in Da-Rocha and Triki ([54]),
however the notion of absence of arbitrage and the condition on agents’ set of
income transfers - transfer space condition, is weaker that those in Da-Rocha
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and Triki ([54]). The transfer space condition we require in this paper is,
for any payoff that can be obtained through the pooled portfolio set there
is some agent who can obtain a fraction of this payoff through her portfolio
set and there is some agent who can obtain a negative of a fraction of this
payoff through her portfolio set. We can interpret this as, for any payoff that
is possible for all agents pooled together, an asset yielding a fraction of that
payoff can be short sold or bought by some agent.
In the Cass approach, the unconstrained agent behaves like in an Arrow-
Debreu economy and is able to accommodate the equilibrium excess demand
for assets. The attainable consumption and asset allocation are then bounded.
We observe that this assumption can be improved upon considerably. If the
set of attainable income transfers is bounded then we can guarantee the ex-
istence of a weak-equilibrium, which differs from an equilibrium only in the
requirement that instead of asset market clearing, there is accounts clearing in
the asset markets. The notion of weak equilibrium is useful for instance when
redundant assets exist.
Section 4.1 describes this notions of absence of arbitrage at the individual
and aggregate level and their relation to equilibrium. Section 4.2, states the
main result and discusses the notion of a weak-equilibrium and its existence.
Section 4.3.1 discusses the various notions of absence of arbitrage and the
compatibility conditions on the space of income transfers needed to guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium. The previous results in this area are listed
as corollaries. Section 4.5 gives a detailed proof of the central result in this
chapter.
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4.1 Arbitrage and equilibrium
This chapter relies on the general framework given by the model in Chapter
2. In the case where portfolio sets are constrained the absence of arbitrage
opportunities at the individual level will differ from that at the aggregate level.
As outlined in Angeloni and Cornet [1] we have the following definition.
Definition 4.1.1 Given the financial structure F = (J, (ξ(j), V j)j∈J , (Zi)i∈I),
the portfolio z¯i ∈ Zi is said to have no arbitrage opportunities or to be
arbitrage-free for agent i ∈ I at the price q ∈ RJ if there is no portfolio
zi ∈ Zi such that WF(q)zi > WF(q)z¯i, that is, [WF(q)zi](ξ) ≥ [WF(q)z¯i](ξ),
for every ξ ∈ D, with at least one strict inequality, or, equivalently, if
WF(q) (Zi − z¯i) ∩ RD+ = {0}.
We say q is an arbitrage free asset price or the financial structure F is said
to be arbitrage-free at (q) if there exists no portfolios zi ∈ Zi (i ∈ I) such that
WF(q)(
∑
i∈I z
i) > 0, or, equivalently, if:
WF(q)
(∑
i∈I
Zi
)
∩ RD+ = {0}.
Let the financial structure F be arbitrage-free at q, and let z¯i ∈ Zi (i ∈ I)
such that
∑
i∈IWF(q)z¯
i = 0, then it is easy to see that, for every i ∈ I,
z¯i is arbitrage-free at q. The converse is true, when
∑
i∈IWF(q)Z
i ⊂ cone
[
⋃
i∈IW (q)(Z
i−z¯i)]. The later is true in particular when some agent’s portfolio
set is unconstrained, that is, Zi = RJ for some i ∈ I.
Consider the following non-satiation assumption:
Assumption NS (i) For every x¯ ∈∏i∈I X i such that ∑i∈I x¯i = ∑i∈I ei,
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(Non-Satiation at Every Node) for every ξi ∈ D, there exists x ∈ ∏i∈I X i
such that, for each ξ 6= ξi, xi(ξ) = x¯i(ξ) and xi ∈ P i(x¯);
(ii) if xi ∈ P i(x¯), then [xi, x¯i[⊂ P i(x¯).
It is well known that if preferences are non-satiated then there is no ar-
bitrage at the individual level. In particular, under (NS), if (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is an
equilibrium of the economy (E ,F), then z¯i is arbitrage-free at q¯ for every i ∈ I
(see Angeloni and Cornet [1]).
However, the set of asset prices at which there is no arbitrage at the in-
dividual level is larger than the set of asset prices that do not offer arbitrage
opportunities at the aggregate level. We thus show that under some conditions
on the space of income transfers, any no-arbitrage price at the aggregate level
can be supported as an equilibrium price.
4.2 Existence of equilibrium
4.2.1 The main existence result
We will prove that when agents’ portfolio sets are constrained, any asset price
that is arbitrage free at the aggregate level can be characterized as an equili-
brium asset price. Our approach however does not cover the general case of
real assets which needs a different treatment. Let us consider, the financial
economy (as described in Chapter 2),
(E ,F) = [D,H, I, (X i, P i, ei)i∈I ;J , (ξ(j), V j)j∈J , (Zi)i∈I ].
Define the set of attainable consumptions by
X̂ =
{
x ∈
∏
i∈I
X i |
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ei
}
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and for each i ∈ I, let X̂ i be the projection of X̂ on X i.
We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption (C) (Consumption Side) For all i ∈ I and all x¯ ∈∏i∈I X i,
(i) X i is a closed and convex subset of RL and X̂ i is compact 1 in RL;
(ii) the preference correspondence P i :
∏
i∈I X
i → X i, is lower semicontinu-
ous 2 and P i(x¯) is convex;
(iii) for every xi ∈ P i(x¯) for every (x′)i ∈ X i, (x′)i 6= xi, [(x′)i, xi[∩P i(x¯) 6=
∅;3
(iv) (Irreflexivity) x¯i 6∈ P i(x¯);
(v) (Non-Satiation of Preferences at Every Node) if
∑
i∈I x¯
i =
∑
i∈I e
i, for
every ξ ∈ D there exists x ∈∏i∈I X i such that, for each ξ′ 6= ξ, xi(ξ′) =
x¯i(ξ′) and xi ∈ P i(x¯);
(vi) (Strong Survival Assumption) ei ∈ intX i.
Assumption (F) (Financial Side) Given an asset price q ∈ RJ ,
(i) for every i ∈ I, Zi is closed, convex and contains zero.
(ii) for every i ∈ I, W (q)Zi is closed and convex;
1Note: X̂i is compact if Xi is bounded below.
2A correspondence ϕ : X −→ Y is said to be lower semicontinuous at x0 ∈ X if, for
every open set V ⊂ Y such that V ∩ ϕ(x0) is not empty, there exists a neighborhood U of
x0 in X such that, for all x ∈ U , V ∩ϕ(x) is nonempty. The correspondence ϕ is said to be
lower semicontinuous if it is lower semicontinuous at each point of X.
3This is satisfied, in particular, when P i(x¯) is open in Xi (for its relative topology).
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We can now state the main theorem characterizing equilibrium asset prices
with arbitrage free asset prices under the appropriate condition on the transfer
space.
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose the financial exchange economy (E ,F) satisfies C
and F. Let q¯ ∈ RJ satisfy the following conditions 4:
(i) [(AF 2): Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(ii) [(W 6): ] Span (W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
(iii) (WEQ) [−
∑
i∈I
Zi] ∩ Ker W (q¯) ⊂
∑
i∈I
[A(Zi) ∩ Ker W (q¯)]
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is an
equilibrium.
4.2.2 Existence of a weak equilibrium
The above result will be proved as a consequence of the following more general
result, which is interesting by itself.
Definition 4.2.1 A weak equilibrium in the economy (E ,F) is a list (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯)
satisfying condition (a) and (b) in Definition 2.2.1 and the following:
(c′)
∑
i∈I
W (q¯)z¯i = 0.
Note that if we remove redundant assets as is done in many models of this
kind (e.g. Cass [13]), then every weak equilibrium will be an equilibrium.
4Given a convex set Y ⊂ Rn, the asymptotic cone of Y is A(Y ) := {t ∈ Rn | y + t ∈
Y, ∀ y ∈ Y }.
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Theorem 4.2.2 Suppose the financial exchange economy (E ,F) satisfies C
and F. Let q¯ ∈ RJ satisfy the following conditions:
(i) [(AF 2): Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(ii) [(W 6) ] Span (W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)].
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 4.2.1 is then a consequence of the following propo-
sition due to Da-Rocha and Triki [54].
Proposition 4.2.1 Existence of a weak equilibrium (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) implies the ex-
istence of an equilibrium if we have:
[−
∑
i∈I
Zi] ∩ Ker W (q¯) ⊂
∑
i∈I
[A(Zi) ∩ Ker W (q¯)].
The condition in Proposition 4.2.1 holds if the following is true:
Ker W ⊂
⋃
i∈I
A(Zi).
4.3 Arbitrage and income transfers
4.3.1 Concept of no-arbitrage at the aggregate level
Various notions of arbitrage free asset prices, found in the literature are listed
below. Given an asset price q¯ ∈ RJ,:
(AF 1) Im (W (q¯))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(AF 2) W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
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(AF 3) W (q¯)A(
∑
i∈I(Z
i))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(AF 4) W (q¯)(
⋃
i∈IA(Z
i))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
If there were some agent with an unconstrained portfolio set then all the
above notions coincide and (AF 1) would suffice to describe absence of arbi-
trage at the aggregate level. Magill and Quinzii [53] use this notion. Da-Rocha
and Triki [54] say that the payoff operator is arbitrage free under (AF 1).
Under constrained portfolio sets AF 2 would be more a more appropriate
notion of absence of arbitrage in the aggregate level. This notion, due to
Angeloni and Cornet [1], is considered in this paper.
The conditions AF 3 and AF 4 are weaker notions of absence of arbitrage.
AF 3 says that there is no infinite arbitrage in the aggregate level. AF 4 says
that no agent by herself can find an infinite arbitrage at q¯. Da-Rocha and
Triki [54] say that financial markets are arbitrage free under this condition.
The relationship between these conditions is given by the following proposition,
the proof of which is immediate.
Proposition 4.3.1 Given q¯ ∈ RJ, we have the following:
AF 1 =⇒ AF 2 =⇒ AF 3 =⇒ AF 4
4.3.2 The transfer space condition
Cass [13] makes the observation that if all agents have constrained portfolio
sets, then in order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium there must be
some agent Mr. i0 such that: ⋃
i∈I
Zi ⊂ Zi0 (4.1)
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This condition states that there must be some agent who can accommodate
the entire excess demand on asset markets. It is important to notice here is
that with only nominal assets the agents problem of choosing a consumption
stream and a portfolio can actually be viewed as two different choice problems.
This due to the fact the income transfers on the financial markets do not de-
pend on the commodity spot prices. On the consumption side each agent plans
to choose an optimal consumption given commodity prices and the possible
income transfers through financial markets. On the financial side each agent
wishes to make the optimal income transfers given the asset prices. Thus all
that matters to each agent, given the asset prices, is the set of possible in-
come transfers that will enable to help her get the ‘best’ possible consumption
stream. This point is well explained in Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6]. Since
this is effectively a condition on the set of possible income transfers, hence its
name ‘Transfer space condition’.
This condition has been assumed and used in the proof of existence when
agents face linear constraints on their portfolio sets (the Zi are strict subspaces
of RJ). For instance Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6] and Cass, Siconolfi and
Villanacci [16]. In fact in Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi [6], they also assume the
dimension of this space of transfers for each agent is equal to the dimension of
the corresponding portfolio set (a subspace) generating it.
In fact Cass [13] conjectures that this condition will ensure existence even
when agents have general portfolio sets that are closed, convex and contain
zero. However, in the case of such general portfolio sets, it turns out that a
slightly different sort of condition is needed. Using Cass’ [13] conjecture as a
motivation, we can modify this requirement as follows. Instead of the union
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of portfolio sets on the left hand side, we actually need the span of the income
transfers from the aggregate portfolio set. These two coincide in case where
portfolio sets are linear. On the right hand side we can actually weaken the
condition to the cone generated by the income transfers from the portfolio set
of some agent Mr.i0. This condition is stated as (W 6) in the statement of
Theorem 4.2.2 and Theorem 4.2.1. Da-Rocha and Triki [54], use a stronger
transfer space condition which is stated as (W 5) below.
There are several versions of this transfer space condition in terms of the
portfolios sets or the possible income transfers that can been assumed, in order
to prove existence of an equilibrium. These are listed below. Given q¯ ∈ RJ :
(W 1) ∃ i ∈ I such that RD = W (q¯)Zi
(W 1s) ∃ i ∈ I such that Zi = RJ
(W 2) Im (W (q¯)) ⊂ ⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)
(W 2s) RJ ⊂ ⋃i∈IZi
(W 3) Span (W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ ⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)
(W 3s) Span (
∑
i∈IZ
i) ⊂ ⋃i∈IZi
(W 4) RD ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
(W 4s) ∃ i ∈ I such that 0 ∈ int (Zi)
(W 5) Im (W (q¯)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
(W 5s) RJ ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IZi]
(W 6) Span (W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
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(W 6s) Span (
∑
i∈IZ
i) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IZi]
(W 7) Span (W (q¯)A(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
(W 7s) Span [A(
∑
i∈IZ
i)] ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IZi]
In the above, each condition with a subscript s is a stronger version of
the condition without the subscript. For instance W1s is stronger W1, and
so on. Moreover the following proposition explains the relationship between
these conditions, the proof of which is immediate.
Proposition 4.3.2 Given q¯ ∈ RJ we have the following:
(a) W 1s =⇒ W 2s =⇒ W 3s =⇒ W 6s
(b) W 1s =⇒ W 4s =⇒ W 5s =⇒ W 6s
(c) W 1 =⇒ W 2 =⇒ W 3 =⇒ W 6
(d) W 1 =⇒ W 4 =⇒ W 5 =⇒ W 6
In order to show that any asset price at which (AF 4) (the most general
notion of no-arbitrage with restricted participation) holds, can be supported
as and equilibrium asset price, a stronger transfer space condition is required.
The following proposition explains the reason for this.
Proposition 4.3.3 Given q¯ ∈ RJ, we have the following:
(i) (Da-Rocha and Triki [54]) AF 4 and W 2 =⇒ AF 1 and W 5
(ii) AF 4 and W 3 =⇒ AF 2 and W 6
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Proof of Proposition 4.3.3 (ii):
By Proposition 4.3.2 we have W 3⇒ W 6. By contradiction suppose AF 3
and W 3 hold but W 6 does not hold. Then there exists w ∈ Span W∑i∈IZi
such that w > 0. For all t ∈ N, tw ∈ Span W∑i∈IZi ⊂ ∪i∈IWZi. Since the
set of agents is finite, there exists i ∈ I and an increasing sequence of integers
(tn)n such that tnw ∈ WZi for each n ∈ N. Let wi ∈ WZi then
(1− 1
tn
)wi +
1
tn
tnw ∈ WZi
Passing to the limit we have wi+w ∈ WZi. Thus w ∈ A(WZi). Contradiction
with AF 3.
4.4 Some consequences of the main theorem
Many of the previous results in the literature can now be states as corollaries
of the central theorems in this chapter, Theorem 4.2.2 and Theorem 4.2.1. In
view of the theorems in this chapter and Proposition 4.3.1, Proposition 4.3.2
and Proposition 4.3.3 we have the following consequences.
Corollary 4.4.1 Unrestricted Case 1: (Cass [13]) If the conditions in
Theorem 4.2.2 are replaced with:
(AF 2) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 1s) ∃ i ∈ I such that Zi = RJ
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
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Corollary 4.4.2 (Angeloni-Cornet [1]) If the conditions in Theorem 4.2.2
are replaced with:
(AF 2) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 4s) ∃ i ∈ I such that 0 ∈ int (Zi)
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
Corollary 4.4.3 If the conditions in Theorem 4.2.2 are replaced with:
(AF 2) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 6s) Span (
∑
i∈IZ
i) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈I(Zi)]
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
Corollary 4.4.4 (Martins Da-Rocha and Triki 1 [54]) If the conditions
in Theorem 4.2.2 are replaced with:
(AF 1) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] Im (W (q¯))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 5) Im (W (q¯)) ⊂ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
Following are some more consequences when the more general notion of no-
arbitrage (AF 4) is used. Notice that the transfer space condition is stronger.
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Corollary 4.4.5 (Unrestricted Case 2) If the conditions in Theorem 4.2.2
are replaced with:
(AF 4) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
⋃
i∈IA(Z
i))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 1s) ∃ i ∈ I such that Zi = RJ
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
Corollary 4.4.6 (Martins Da-Rocha and Triki 2 [54]) If the conditions
in Theorem 4.2.2 are replaced with:
(AF 4) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
⋃
i∈IA(Z
i))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 2) Im (W (q¯)) ⊂ ⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
Corollary 4.4.7 If the conditions in Theorem 4.2.2 are replaced with:
(AF 4) [Arbitrage-free at q¯] W (q¯)(
⋃
i∈IA(Z
i))
⋂
RD+ = {0}
(W 3) Span (W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i)) ⊂ ⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)
Then there exists (x¯, z¯, p¯) with p¯(ξ) 6= 0,∀ ξ ∈ D such that (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium.
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4.4.1 Counterexample 1:
It is possible to find a meaningful example where (AF 2) and (W 6) does not
imply (AF 1) and (W 5). Thus the set of asset prices used to characterize weak
equilibrium asset prices in Theorem 4.2.2 is larger than that in Da-Rocha and
Triki [54].
Let T = {0, 1}, D = {0, 1, 2} and I = {1, 2}. Let J = {1, 2} such that
for all j ∈ J , ξ(j) = 0. The payoffs are given by V 1 = (2, 1) and V 2 = (2, 2).
Consider the asset price q¯ = (2, 2). Then the total payoff matrix is given by:
W (q¯, V ) =

−2 −2
2 2
1 2

Let
Z1 = Z2 = {α(1, 1) | α ∈ [−1, 1]}
then
W (q¯, V )Z1 = W (q¯, V )Z2 = {α(−4, 4, 3) | α ∈ [−1, 1]}
W (q¯, V )(
∑
i∈I
Zi) = {α(−8, 8, 6) | α ∈ [−1, 1]}
span [W (q¯, V )(
∑
i∈I
Zi)] = cone (∪i∈IW (q¯, V )Zi)
At this price q¯, (AF 2) and (W 6) are satisfied but not (AF 1) and (W 5).
This price q¯ can be characterized as an equilibrium asset price according to
Theorem 4.2.2.
For instance suppose there is only one good available in each state and the
two agents have the following endowments and utility functions:
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e1 = (2, 6, 6) and u1(x1(0), x1(1), x1(2)) = 2x1(0) + x1(1) + x1(2)
e2 = (4, 4, 3) and u2(x2(0), x2(1), x2(2)) = x2(0) + 2x2(1) + 2x2(2)
Each agent i’s income transfer potential is determined by αi ∈ [−1, 1].
After incorporating the budget constraints, we can then write the reduced
from utility functions in terms of the choice of portfolio αi.
uˆ1(α1) = 16− α1
uˆ2(α2) = 18 + 10α2
The agents can then be viewed as maximizing their reduced form utilities
over their choice of αi ∈ [−1, 1]. So α1 = −1 maximizes agent 1’s utility and
α2 = 1 maximizes agent 2’s utility.
Thus x¯1 = (6, 2, 3); z¯1 = (−1,−1) and x¯2 = (0, 8, 6); z¯2 = (1, 1) along with
q¯ = (2, 2) is an equilibrium.
Modifying the above example so that the transfer space requirement (W
6) does not hold, the impossibility of the characterization result is given in the
following example.
4.4.2 Counterexample 2:
Here we show that the conditions in Theorem 4.2.2 are fairly tight. That is if
AF 2 and W 6 do not hold at some price q¯, then q¯ cannot be an equilibrium
asset price.
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Consider the example above with the following modification of the agents’
portfolio sets:
Z1 = Z2 = {α(1, 1) | α ∈ [0, 1]}
then
W (q¯, V )Z1 = W (q¯, V )Z2 = {α(−4, 4, 3) | α ∈ [0, 1]}
W (q¯, V )(
∑
i∈I
Zi) = {α(−8, 8, 6) | α ∈ [0, 1]}
The same price in the previous example q¯ does not provide arbitrage oppor-
tunities at the aggregate level, since
W (q¯, V )(
∑
i∈I
Zi) ∩ RD+ = {0}
However the transfer space condition does not hold, since
span W (q¯, V )(
∑
i∈I
Zi) = {α(−4, 4, 3) | α ∈ R}
is not contained in
cone[
⋃
i∈I
W (q¯, V )Zi] = {α(−4, 4, 3) | α ∈ R+}
Again working with the reduced form utility functions as in the previous exam-
ple, note that for accounts clearing in the asset market at q¯ we need α1 = −α2.
Given Z1 and Z2, this is possible only when α1 = α2 = 0. However, from agent
2’s problem in the previous example we see that α2 = 1 is feasible within her
budget restrictions and maximizes her reduced form utility. Thus q = (2, 2)
cannot be an equilibrium asset price.
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4.5 Proof of main theorem
4.5.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2.2 (under additional assump-
tions):
Additional assumptions (K)
(i) The sets X i and W (q¯)Zi are bounded;
(ii)[Local Non-Satiation] for every x¯ ∈ ∏i∈I X i, for every xi ∈ P i(x¯) then
[xi, x¯i[⊂ P i(x¯).
Before entering the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 we will state and prove the follow-
ing:
Lemma 4.5.1 If Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 4.2.2 hold at q¯ then
under Assumption (K) there exists λ ∈ RD++ such that:
W (q¯)(
∑
i∈I
Zi) ⊂ λ⊥ := {t ∈ RD | λ •D t = 0}
Proof of Lemma 4.5.1: For all i ∈ I, W (q¯)(Zi) is compact (by F and K(i)).
Thus W (q¯)(
∑
i∈IZ
i) is compact and hence closed. Since F is arbitrage free
(Condition (i) in theorem) at q¯, there exists λ ∈ RD++ such that
∀ w ∈
∑
i∈I
W (q¯)Zi, λ •D w ≤ 0.
Since ∀ i ∈ I, 0 ∈ W (q¯)Zi, we have ∀ wi ∈ W (q¯)Zi, λ •D wi ≤ 0. By (ii)
∀ w ∈ W (q¯)(∑i∈IZi),−w ∈ cone [⋃i∈IW (q¯)(Zi)]. Thus ∃k ∈ I,∃α > 0 such
that −w = αwk for some wk ∈ W (q¯)Zk. Thus −λ •D w = λ •D (αwk) ≤ 0.
To simplify the notation, in the following we will suppress the dependence
of W on q¯.
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Preliminaries
Define the following5:
B = {p ∈ RL | ||λ p|| ≤ 1}
ρ(p) = 1− ||λ p||
Let I1 = (1, . . . , 1) denote the element in RD, whose coordinates are all equal
to one.
Let Γ denote the space of continuous functions from B to RD. For every
γ ∈ Γ we have γ = (γ(p, ξ))ξ∈D.
Given p ∈ B and γ ∈ Γ, for all i ∈ I define:
βiγ(p) =
{
(xi, wi) ∈ X i×WZi : ∃τ i ∈ [0, 1], p (xi−ei) ≤ wi+τiγ(p)+ρ(p)I1
}
,
αiγ(p) =
{
(xi, wi) ∈ X i×WZi : ∃τ i ∈ [0, 1], p (xi−ei) wi+τiγ(p)+ρ(p)I1
}
.
Using the procedure outlined in Da-Rocha and Triki [54] we choose γ ∈ Γ
as in the following lemma, and drop the subscript γ from the above sets βi(p)
and αi(p).
Lemma 4.5.2 There exists a continuous mapping γ : B → RD such that:
(i) ∀ p ∈ B, λ •D γ(p) = 0
(ii) ∀ p ∈ B, ∀ w ∈ W (∑i∈IZi), w •D γ(p) = 0
(iii) ∀ p ∈ B,⋃i∈Iαiγ(p) 6= ∅
5For x ∈ Rn, ||x|| denotes the euclidean norm.
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Proof of Lemma 4.5.2: Define the following subsets of Γ:
Γ1 := {γ ∈ Γ | ∀ p ∈ B, γ(p) ∈ λ⊥}
Γ2 := {γ ∈ Γ | ∀ p ∈ B, γ(p) ∈ [W (
∑
i∈I
Zi)]⊥}
Γ3 := {γ ∈ Γ | ∀ p ∈ B,
⋃
i∈I
αiγ(p) 6= ∅}
We will show that Γ1 ∩ Γ2 ∩ Γ3 6= ∅.
Step(1): Γ1 ∩ Γ2 6= ∅
Define the set
∆ = {δ ∈ RD | δ ∈ λ⊥ ∩ [(W (
∑
i∈I
Zi))]⊥, ||δ|| ≤ 1}
Notice from assumption C that ∃ r > 0 such that ∀ i ∈ I, U := BL(0, r) ⊂
X i.
Define the correspondence Ψ from B to ∆ by
Ψ(p) = {δ ∈ ∆ | ∃ u ∈ U,∃ w ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈I
Zi)), p u << w + δ + ρ(p)I1}
We will show that there is a continuous selection γ of Ψ such that γ ∈ Γ1∩Γ2.
In order to do this we will use the continuous selection result in Proposition
1.5.3, Florenzano [28].
Firstly, notice that ∀ p ∈ B,Ψ(p) is clearly convex valued. To see this, let
δ1 ∈ Ψ(p) and δ2 ∈ Ψ(p), then
∃ u1 ∈ U,∃ w1 ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈I
Zi)) : p u1 << w1 + δ1 + ρ(p)I1
∃ u2 ∈ U,∃ w2 ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈I
Zi)) : p u2 << w2 + δ2 + ρ(p)I1
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Then for all α ∈ [0, 1], (αu1+(1−α)u2) ∈ U, (αw1+(1−α)w2) ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈IZ
i))
and (αδ1 + (1− α)δ2) ∈ ∆, and
p (αu1 + (1− α)u2) << (αw1 + (1− α)w2) + (αδ1 + (1− α)δ2) + ρ(p)I1
Thus for all p ∈ B,Ψ(p) is convex.
Also, notice that ∀ p ∈ B,Ψ(p) 6= ∅. To see this, let p ∈ B,
Case(i) ρ(p) > 0: Let u = 0 and w = 0 then δ = 0 ∈ Ψ(p).
Case (ii) ρ(p) = 0: i.e.
∑
ξ∈D λ(ξ)
2||p(ξ)||2 = 1. Since λ >> 0,∃ ξ ∈ D such
that p(ξ) 6= 0. Thus ∃ u ∈ U such that p u < 0. Since λ >> 0,∃ t ∈ λ⊥ such
that p u << t.
Since RD = Span (W (
∑
i∈IZ
i))+[W (
∑
i∈IZ
i)]⊥, there exists w ∈ Span (W (∑i∈IZi))
and δ ∈ [W (∑i∈IZi)]⊥ such that t = w + δ. Using Lemma 4.5.1 we can see
that,
0 = λ •D t = λ •D w + λ •D δ = 0 + λ •D δ = λ •D δ
Thus δ ∈ λ⊥. Now we have
p u << w + δ
For τ > 0 small enough
p (τu) << τw + τδ
with τu ∈ U, τw ∈ Span (W (∑i∈IZi)) and ||τδ|| ≤ 1. Hence τδ ∈ Ψ(p).
Thus Ψ(p) 6= ∅. In view of Case (i) and Case (ii), ∀ p ∈ B,Ψ(p) 6= ∅.
Now we can show that Ψ is lower semicontinuous on B.
Denote the graph of Ψ by,
GΨ : {(p, δ) ∈ B ×∆ | δ ∈ Ψ(p)}
54
We will show GΨ is open and hence Ψ is l.s.c. In fact we will show (B ×
∆) \ GΨ is closed. Let {(pn, δn)} ∈ (B × ∆) \ GΨ and (pn, δn) → (p, δ). By
contradiction suppose (p, δ) ∈ GΨ. Then ∃ u¯ ∈ U,∃ w¯ ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈IZ
i))
such that
∀ ξ ∈ D, p(ξ) •H u¯(ξ) << w¯(ξ) + δ(ξ) + ρ(p) (∗)
Also ∀ n, δn /∈ Ψ(pn) thus ∀ n,∀ u ∈ U and ∀ w ∈ Span (W (
∑
i∈IZ
i))
∃ ξ ∈ D such that pn(ξ) •H u(ξ) ≥ w(ξ) + δn(ξ) + ρ(p)
in particular,
∃ ξ ∈ D such that pn(ξ) •H u¯(ξ) ≥ w¯(ξ) + δn(ξ) + ρ(p)
Since pn → p, ρ(pn)→ ρ(p) and ∀ ξ inD, pn(ξ)→ p(ξ). Since δn → δ,∀ ξ inD, δn(ξ)→
δ(ξ). Thus in the limit
∃ ξ ∈ D such that p(ξ) •H u¯(ξ) ≥ w¯(ξ) + δ(ξ) + ρ(p)
Contradiction with (∗). Thus Ψ is l.s.c. on B.
Applying Proposition 1.5.3 in Florenzano [28] we can conclude that there
is a continuous selection γ of Ψ and ∀ p ∈ B, γ(p) ∈ λ⊥∩ [W (∑i∈IZi)]⊥. Thus
γ ∈ Γ1 ∩ Γ2.
Step(2): Γ1 ∩ Γ2 ⊂ Γ3
Let γ be the continuous selection of Ψ obtained in Step (1) above. We
need to show ∀ p ∈ B, ∃ k ∈ I such that αkγ(p) 6= ∅. To see this, let p ∈ B
Case(i) ρ(p) > 0: for all i ∈ I with τ i = 0 we have (xi, wi) = (ei, 0) ∈ αiγ(p).
Case(ii) ρ(p) = 0. Since γ(p) ∈ Ψ(p), ∃ u ∈ U,∃ w ∈ Span (W (∑i∈IZi)) such
that
p u << w + γ(p)
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for τ ∈ (0, 1] small enough
p (τu) << τw + τγ(p)
with (τu) ∈ U , (τw) ∈ WZk for some k ∈ I (by Condition (ii) in Theorem
4.2.2). Thus there exists k ∈ I such that setting τ k = τ we have (τu+ek, τw) ∈
αkγ(p). Thus γ ∈ Γ3.
In view of Step (1) and Step (2) we have Γ1 ∩ Γ2 ∩ Γ3 6= ∅.
The fixed point argument
For (x,w, p) ∈∏i∈I X i×∏i∈IWZi×B, we define the correspondences Φi for
i ∈ I0 = {0} ∪ I as follows:
Φ0(x,w, p) =
{
(p′) ∈ B | λ (p′ − p) •L
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei) > 0
}
,
and for every i ∈ I,
Φi(x,w, p) =

{(ei, 0)} if (xi, wi) /∈ βi(p) and αi(p) = ∅,
βi(p) if (xi, wi) /∈ βi(p) and αi(p) 6= ∅,
αi(p) ∩ (P i(x)×WZi) if (xi, wi) ∈ βi(p).
The existence proof relies on the following fixed-point-type theorem due to
Gale and MasCollel ([31]).
Theorem 4.5.1 Let I0 be a finite set, let Ci (i ∈ I0) be a nonempty, compact,
convex subset of some Euclidean space, let C =
∏
i∈I0 C
i and let Φi (i ∈ I0)
be a correspondence from C to Ci, which is lower semicontinuous and convex-
valued. Then, there exists c¯ ∈ C such that, for every i ∈ I0 [either c¯i ∈ Φi(c¯)
or Φi(c¯) = ∅].
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We now show that, the set C0 = B, and for all i ∈ I, Ci = X i×Zi and the
above defined correspondences Φi (i ∈ I0) satisfy the assumptions of Theorem
4.5.1.
Claim 4.5.1 For every c¯ := (x¯, w¯, p¯, ) ∈∏i∈I X i ×∏i∈IWZi ×B,
(i) Φi(c¯) is convex (possibly empty)
(ii) p¯ 6∈ Φ0(c¯), and for all i ∈ I, (x¯i, w¯i) 6∈ Φi(c¯)
(iii) for every i ∈ I0, the correspondence Φi is lower semicontinuous at c¯
Proof of Claim 4.5.1: Let c¯ := (x¯, y¯, (p¯)) ∈ ∏i∈I X i ×∏i∈IWZi × B be
given.
Proof of (i): Clearly Φ0(c¯) is convex. For every i ∈ I, recalling that P i(x¯)
and WZi are convex sets, by Assumption (C) and (F), we have Φ(c¯) is a
convex set.
Proof of (ii): Clearly, (p¯) 6∈ Φ0(c¯) and (x¯i, w¯i) 6∈ Φi(c¯) follows from the
definitions of these sets and the fact that x¯i 6∈ P i(x¯) (from Assumption (C)).
Proof of (iii): We need to show Φi is lower semicontinuous for all i ∈ I0.
Since Φ0 has an open graph, clearly it is lower semicontinuous. To show lower
semicontinuity of Φi for i ∈ I, we will distinguish three cases:
Case(1) : (x¯i, w¯i) /∈ βi(p¯) and αi(p¯) = ∅. Then Φi(c¯) = {(ei, 0)} ⊂ U . The
set Ωi = {(xi, wi, p) | (xi, wi) /∈ βi(p)} is an open subset of X i ×WZi × B
(by Assumptions (C) and (F)). To see this, let {(xn, wn, pn)} be such that
(xn, wn) ∈ βi(pn) and (xn, wn, pn) → (x,w, p). Since for all n, (xn, wn) ∈
βi(pn), there exists τn ∈ [0, 1] such that
pn (xn − ei) ≤ wn + τnγ(pn) + ρ(pn)I1
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In the limit we have
p (x− ei) ≤ w + τγ(p) + ρ(p)I1
Where τ = limn→∞τn ∈ [0, 1]. Thus (x,w) ∈ βi(p).
Thus Ωi contains an open neighborhood O of c¯. Now, let c = (x,w, p) ∈ O.
If αi(p) = ∅ then Φi(c) = {(ei, 0)} ⊂ U and so Φi(c) ∩ U is nonempty. If
αi(p) 6= ∅ then Φi(c) = βi(p). But Assumptions (C) and (F) imply that
(ei, 0) ∈ X i × WZi, hence (ei, 0) ∈ βi(p) ( with τ i = 0 and noticing that
ρ(p) ≥ 0). So {(ei, 0)} ⊂ Φi(c) ∩ U which is also nonempty.
Case(2) : c¯ = (x¯i, w¯i, p¯) ∈ Ωi := {c = (xi, wi, p) : (xi, wi) /∈ βi(p) and
αi(p) 6= ∅}. Then the set Ωi is clearly open (since its complement is closed).
On the set Ωi one has Φi(c) = βi(p). We recall that ∅ 6= Φi(c¯)∩U = βi(p¯)∩
U . We notice that βi(p¯) = cl αi(p¯) since αi(p¯) 6= ∅. Consequently, αi(p¯)∩U 6= ∅
and we chose a point (xi, wi) ∈ αi(p¯) ∩ U , that is, (xi, wi) ∈ [X i ×WZi] ∩ U
and for some τ i ∈ [0, 1],
p¯ (xi − ei) wi + τ iγ(p¯) + ρ(p¯)I1.
Clearly the above inequality is also satisfied for the same point (xi, wi) and
the same τ i when p belongs to a neighborhood O of p¯ small enough (using the
continuity of ρ(·) and γ(·)). This shows that on O one has ∅ 6= αi(p) ∩ U ⊂
βi(p) ∩ U = Φ(c) ∩ U .
Case(3) : (x¯i, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯). By assumption we have
∅ 6= Φi(c¯) ∩ U = αi(p¯) ∩ [P i(x¯)×WZi] ∩ U.
By an argument similar to what is done above, one shows that there exists an
open neighborhood N of p¯ and an open set M such that, for every p ∈ N , one
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has ∅ 6= M ⊂ αi(p)∩U . Since P i is lower semicontinuous at c¯ (by Assumption
(C)), there exists an open neighborhood Ω of c¯ such that, for every c ∈ Ω,
∅ 6= [P i(x)×WZi] ∩M , hence
∅ 6= [P i(x)×WZi] ∩ αi(p) ∩ U ⊂ βi(p) ∩ U, for every c ∈ Ω.
Consequently, from the definition of Φi, we get ∅ 6= Φi(c)∩U , for every c ∈ Ω.
The correspondence Ψi := αi ∩ (P i×WZi) is lower semicontinuous on the
whole set, being the intersection of an open graph correspondence and a lower
semicontinuous correspondence. Then there exists an open neighborhood O
of c¯ := (x¯, w¯, p¯) such that, for every (x,w, p) ∈ O, then U ∩ Ψi(x,w, p) 6= ∅
hence ∅ 6= U ∩ Φi(x,w, p) (since we always have Ψi(x,w, p) ⊂ Φi(x,w, p)).
In view of Claim 4.5.1, we can apply the Gale-MasColell theorem. Then
we have the following :
∀ p ∈ B, p
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) ≤ p¯
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) (4.2)
∀i ∈ I, (x¯i, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯) and αi(p¯) ∩ (P i(x¯)×WZi) = ∅. (4.3)
∀ i ∈ I, ∃ z¯i ∈ Zi such that w¯i = W (q¯)z¯i. (4.4)
The list (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak equilibrium
Claim 4.5.2
∑
i∈I(x¯
i − ei) = 0.
Proof of Claim 4.5.2:
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Suppose
∑
i∈I(x¯
i − ei) 6= 0. From Assertion 4.2 we have
∀ p ∈ B, p
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) ≤ p¯
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei)
scalar product with λ gives
∀ p ∈ B, (λ p) •L
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) ≤ (λ p¯) •L
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei)
Thus (λ p¯) =
P
i∈I(x¯
i−ei)
||Pi∈I(x¯i−ei)|| and ||λ p|| = 1. So (λ p¯) •L
∑
i∈I(x¯
i − ei) > 0.
From Assertion (4.3) ∀ i ∈ I, ∃ τ¯ i ∈ [0, 1] such that
p¯ (x¯i − ei) ≤ w¯i + τ¯iγ(p¯) + ρ(p¯)I1
sum over i to get:
p¯
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) ≤
∑
i∈I
w¯i + (
∑
i∈I
τ¯i)γ(p¯) + Iρ(p¯)I1
taking scalar product with λ we have the following:
(λ p¯) •L
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei) ≤ λ •D
∑
i∈I
w¯i + λ •D (
∑
i∈I
τ¯i)γ(p¯) + Iρ(p¯)λ · I1
On the RHS we have
λ •D
∑
i∈I
w¯i = 0 ( by Lemma 4.5.1)
(
∑
i∈I
τ¯i)λ •D γ(p¯) = 0 ( since γ ∈ Γ1)
ρ(p¯) = 0 ( since ||λ p¯|| = 1)
Thus (λ p¯) •L
∑
i∈I(x¯
i − ei) ≤ 0. Contradiction.
Claim 4.5.3 The following conditions hold:
(i) ∀ ξ ∈ RD, p¯(ξ) 6= 0
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(ii) ∀ i ∈ I, (x¯i, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯) and βi(p¯) ∩ (P i(x¯)×WZi) = ∅
Proof of Claim 4.5.3: Since γ ∈ Γ3,∃ k ∈ I such that αk(p¯) 6= ∅. We will
first show Condition (ii) for consumer k.
From Assertion (4.3) in the fixed point theorem, for consumer k one has
(x¯k, w¯k) ∈ βk(p¯). Now, suppose that βk(p¯) ∩ (P k(x¯) × WZi) 6= ∅ and let
(xk, wk) ∈ βk(p¯) ∩ (P k(x¯) × WZk). Since γ ∈ Γ3 we have αk(p¯) 6= ∅ and
we let (x¯k, w¯k) ∈ αk(p¯).
Suppose first that x¯k = xk, then, from above (xk, w¯k) ∈ [P k(x¯)×WZk] ∩
αk(p¯), which contradicts the fact that this set is empty by Assertion (4.3).
Suppose now that x¯k 6= xk, from Assumption (C.iii), (recalling that xk ∈
P k(x¯)) the set [x¯k, xk[∩P k(x¯) is nonempty, hence contains a point xk(λ) :=
(1 − λ)x¯k + λxk for some λ ∈ [0, 1[. We let wk(λ) := (1 − λ)w¯k + λwk and
we check that (xk(λ), wk(λ)) ∈ αk(p¯) (since (xk, wk) ∈ βk(p¯) and (x¯k, w¯k) ∈
αk(p¯)). Consequently, αk(p¯) ∩ (P k(x¯) ×WZk) 6= ∅, which contradicts again
Assertion (4.3).
Thus for agent k we have
(x¯k, w¯k) ∈ βk(p¯) and βk(p¯) ∩ (P k(x¯)×WZk) = ∅ (∗∗)
Proof of (i): Suppose there exists ξ ∈ D such that p(ξ) = 0. From Claim
4.5.2,
∑
i∈I x¯
i =
∑
i∈Ie
i, and from the Non-Satiation Assumption at node ξ
(for Consumer k) there exists xk ∈ P k(x¯) such that xk(ξ′) = x¯k(ξ′) for every
ξ
′ 6= ξ; from Assertion (4.3), (x¯k, w¯k) ∈ βk(p¯) and, recalling that p¯(ξ) = 0, one
deduces that (xk, w¯k) ∈ βk(p¯). Consequently,
βk(p¯) ∩ [P k(x¯) ∩WZk] 6= ∅,
which contradicts (∗∗).
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Proof of (ii): From Assertion (4.3), for all i ∈ I one has (x¯i, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯).
From the Survival Assumption and the fact that p¯(ξ) 6= 0 for every ξ ∈ D (by
Part (i) of this claim), one deduces that αi(p¯) 6= ∅. 6
For each i ∈ I \{k} we can repeating the same steps done in the beginning
of the proof of this claim to get that for all i ∈ I, (x¯i, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯) and βi(p¯) ∩
(P i(x¯)×WZi) = ∅.
Claim 4.5.4 The following conditions hold:
(i) ρ(p¯) = 0
(ii)
∑
i∈Iw¯
i = 0
(iii) ∀ i ∈ I, τ¯ iγ(p¯) = 0
Proof of Claim 4.5.4:
Proof of (i): We first prove that the modified budget constraints are binding,
that is for all i ∈ I we have the following assertion:
p¯ (x¯i − ei) = w¯i + τ¯ iγ(p¯) + ρ(p¯)I1 (4.5)
Suppose not, then there exists i ∈ I such that
p¯ (x¯i − ei) < w¯i + τ¯ iγ(p¯) + ρ(p¯)I1
That is there exist ξ ∈ D such that
p¯(ξ) •H (x¯i(ξ)− ei(ξ)) < w¯i(ξ) + τ¯ iγ(p¯)(ξ) + ρ(p¯)
6Take w¯i = 0, τ¯ i = 0 and x¯i = ei − tp¯ for t > 0 small enough, so that x¯i ∈ Xi (from the
Survival Assumption). Then notice that p¯ (x¯i − ei) = −t(p¯ p¯) 0 ≤ +0 + ρ(p¯)I1.
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But by Claim 4.5.2,
∑
i∈I x¯
i =
∑
i∈Ie
i and by the nonsatiation assumption
C(v) for consumer i, there exists xi ∈ P i(x¯) such that xi(ξ′) = x¯i(ξ′) for
every ξ′ 6= ξ. Consequently, we can choose x ∈ [xi, x¯i[ close enough to x¯i so
that (x, w¯i) ∈ βi(p¯). But, from the local non-satiation (Assumption (K.ii)),
[xi, x¯i[⊂ P i(x¯). Consequently, βi(p¯) ∩ (P i(x¯) ×WZi) 6= ∅ which contradicts
Claim 4.5.3.
In Assertion 4.5 taking scalar product with λ yields:
(λ p¯) •L (x¯i − ei) = λ •D w¯i + τ¯ iλ •D γ(p¯) + ρ(p¯)λ •L I1
Since γ ∈ Γ1, λ •D γ(p¯) = 0. So we have,
(λ p¯) •H (x¯i − ei) = λ •D w¯i + ρ(p¯)λ •D I1
Summing over i ∈ I, we have
(λ p¯) •L (
∑
i∈I
(x¯i − ei)) = λ •D (
∑
i∈I
w¯i) + Iρ(p¯)λ •D I1
Since
∑
i∈Iw¯
i ∈ W (q¯)(∑i∈IZi), by Lemma 4.5.1 and Claim 4.5.2 we have:
0 = Iρ(p¯)λ •D I1
Thus ρ(p¯) = 0.
Proof of (ii) and (iii): In Assertion (4.5) in view of Claim 4.5.4 (i), we have
∀ i ∈ I:
p¯ (x¯i − ei) = w¯i + τ¯ iγ(p¯)
Summing over i ∈ I and using Claim 4.5.2 we have:
0 =
∑
i∈I
w¯i + (
∑
i∈I
τ¯ i)γ(p¯)
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Since γ ∈ Γ2 we have
0 = (
∑
i∈I
τ¯ i)γ(p¯) · (
∑
i∈I
w¯i) = −(
∑
i∈I
w¯i) · (
∑
i∈I
w¯i)
Thus
∑
i∈Iw
i = 0. Since ∀ i ∈ I, τ i ≥ 0 and (∑i∈I τ¯ i)γ(p¯) = 0 we have
∀ i ∈ I, τ¯ iγ(p¯) = 0.
Claim 4.5.5 For every i ∈ I, (x¯i, z¯i) ∈ Bi(p¯, q¯) and [P i(x¯)×Zi]∩Bi(p¯, q¯) = ∅.
Proof of Claim 4.5.5: In view of Claim 4.5.4 and Assertion 4.3, we have for
all i ∈ I
p (x¯i − ei) = w¯i
Thus in view of Assertion 4.4 (x¯i, z¯i) ∈ Bi(p¯, q¯).
Moreover by Assertion 4.3
βi(p¯) ∩ [P i(x¯)×WZi] = ∅
This condition along with Assertion 4.4 implies
Bi(p¯, q¯) ∩ [P i(x¯)× Zi] = ∅
Note that by Assertion 4.4 for all i ∈ I there exists z¯i ∈ Zi such that w¯i =
W (q¯)z¯i. Suppose Bi(p¯, q¯) ∩ [P i(x¯)× Zi] 6= ∅. Then it contains a point (xi, zi)
such that
p (xi − ei) ≤ W (q¯)zi
Letting wi = W (q¯)zi we have (xi, wi) ∈ βi(p¯). Also xi ∈ P i(x¯). Thus (xi, wi) ∈
[P i(x¯)×WZi]. Which implies βi(p¯)∩ [P i(x¯)×WZi] 6= ∅. Contradiction with
Assertion 4.3.]
In view of Claim 4.5.2, Assertion 4.4, Claim 4.5.3, Claim 4.5.4 and Claim
4.5.5 we have (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak equilibrium.
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4.5.2 Proof in the general case (without additional as-
sumptions)
We now give the proof of Theorem 4.2.2, without considering the additional
Assumption (K), as in the previous section. We will first enlarge the strict
preferred sets as in Gale-Mas Colell, and then truncate the economy E by a
standard argument to define a new economy Eˆr, which satisfies all the assump-
tions of E , together with the additional Assumption (K). From the previous
section, there exists a weak equilibrium of Eˆr and we will then check that it is
also a weak equilibrium of E .
Enlarging the preferences as in Gale and Mas-Colell
The original preferences P i are replaced by the ”enlarged” ones Pˆ i defined as
follows. For every i ∈ I, x¯ ∈∏i∈I X i we let
Pˆ i(x¯) :=
⋃
xi∈P i(x¯)
]x¯i, xi] = {x¯i + t(xi − x¯i) | t ∈]0, 1], xi ∈ P i(x¯)}.
The next proposition shows that Pˆ i satisfies the same properties as P i, for
every i ∈ I, together with the additional Local Nonsatiation Assumption
(K.ii).
Proposition 4.5.1 Under (C), for every i ∈ I and every x¯ ∈ ∏i∈I X i one
has:
(i) P i(x¯) ⊂ Pˆ i(x¯) ⊂ X i;
(ii) the correspondence Pˆ i is lower semicontinuous at x¯ and Pˆ i(x¯) is convex;
(iii) for every yi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯) for every (x′)i ∈ X i, (x′)i 6= yi then [(x′)i, yi[∩Pˆ i(x¯) 6=
∅;
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(iv) x¯i 6∈ Pˆ i(x¯);
(v) (Non-Satiation at Every Node) if
∑
i∈I x¯
i =
∑
i∈I e
i, for every ξ ∈ D, there
exists x ∈∏i∈I X i such that, for each ξ′ 6= ξ, xi(ξ′) = x¯i(ξ′) and xi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯);
(vi) for every yi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯), then [yi, x¯i[⊂ Pˆ i(x¯).
Proof. Let x¯ ∈∏i∈I X i and let i ∈ I.
Part (i). It follows by the convexity of X i, for every i ∈ I.
Part (ii). Let yi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯) and consider a sequence (x¯n)n ⊂
∏
i∈I X
i converging
to x¯. Since yi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯), then yi = x¯i + t(xi − x¯i) for some xi ∈ P i(x¯) and
some t ∈]0, 1]. Since P i is lower semicontinuous, there exists a sequence (xin)
converging to xi such that xin ∈ P i(x¯n) for every n ∈ N. Now define yin :=
x¯in + t(x
i
n − x¯in) ∈]x¯in, xin]: then yin ∈ Pˆ i(x¯n) and obviously the sequence (yin)
converges to yi. This shows that Pˆ i is lower semicontinuous at x¯.
To show that Pˆ i(x¯) is convex, let yi1, y
i
2 ∈ Pˆ i(x¯), let λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, such
that λ1 +λ2 = 1, we show that λ1y
i
1 +λ2y
i
2 ∈ Pˆ i(x¯). Then yik = x¯i+ tk(xik− x¯i)
for some tk ∈]0, 1] and some xik ∈ P i(x¯) (k = 1, 2). One has
λ1y
i
1 + λ2y
i
2 = x¯
i + (λ1t1 + λ2t2)(x
i − x¯i),
where xi := (λ1t1x
i
1 + λ2t2x
i
2)/(λ1t1 + λ2t2) ∈ P i(x¯) (since P i(x¯) is convex, by
Assumption (C)) and λ1t1 + λ2t2 ∈]0, 1]. Hence λ1yi1 + λ2yi2 ∈ Pˆ i(x¯).
Part (iii). Let yi ∈ Pˆ i(x¯) and let (x′)i ∈ X i, (x′)i 6= yi. From the definition of
Pˆ i, yi = x¯i + t(xi − x¯i) for some xi ∈ P i(x¯) and some t ∈]0, 1]. Suppose first
that xi = (x′)i, then yi ∈]x¯i, xi[⊂ Pˆ i(x¯). Consequently, [(x′)i, yi[∩Pˆ i(x¯) 6= ∅.
Suppose now that xi 6= (x′)i; since P i satisfies Assumption (C.iii), there exists
λ ∈ [0, 1[ such that xi(λ) = (x′)i + λ(xi − (x′)i) ∈ P i(x¯). We let
z := [λ(1− t)x¯i + t(1− λ)(x′)i + tλxi]/α with α := t+ λ(1− t),
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and we check that z = [λ(1− t)x¯i + txi(λ)]/α ∈]x¯i, xi(λ)], with xi(λ) ∈ P i(x¯),
hence z ∈ Pˆ i(x¯). Moreover, z := [λyi + t(1 − λ)(x′)i]/α ∈ [(x′)i, yi[. Conse-
quently, [(x′)i, yi[∩Pˆ i(x¯) 6= ∅, which ends the proof of (iii)).
Parts (iv), (v) and (vi). They follow immediately by the definition of Pˆ i and
the properties satisfied by P i in (C).
Truncating the economy
Given q ∈ RJ the set of admissible consumptions and income transfers, K(q)
is given by:
K(q) :={(x,w) ∈∏i∈I X i ×∏i∈IW (q)Zi : ∃p ∈ BL(0, 1),
(xi, wi) ∈ Bi(p, q) for every i ∈ I, ∑i∈Ixi = ∑i∈Iei, ∑i∈Iwi = 0}.
Lemma 4.5.3 K(q) is bounded.
Proof of Lemma 4.5.3: Given q ∈ RJ, for every i ∈ I define the following:
Xˆ i(q) :=
{
xi ∈ X i : ∃(xj)j 6=i ∈
∏
j 6=i
Xj, ∃w ∈
∏
i∈I
WZi, (x,w) ∈ K(q)
}
and
Ŵ i(q) :=
{
wi ∈ WZi : ∃(wj)j 6=i ∈
∏
j 6=i
WZj, ∃x ∈
∏
i∈I
X i, (x,w) ∈ K(q)
}
.
We need to show that Xˆ i(q) and Ŵ i(q) are bounded. Since Xˆ i is compact (by
Assumption C (i)), clearly Xˆ i(q) is bounded. To show Ŵ i(q) is bounded, let
wi ∈ Ŵ i(q). Since
(xi, wi) ∈ {(x,w) ∈ X i ×W (q)Zi | p (x− ei) ≤ w}
and (xi, p) ∈ Xˆ i(q)×BL(0, 1), a compact set from above, ∃ αi ∈ RD, such that
αi ≤ p (xi − ei) ≤ wi
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Using the fact that
∑
i∈Iw
i = 0 we also have
wi = −
∑
j 6=i
wj ≤ −
∑
j 6=i
αj,
Thus Ŵ i(q) is bounded for every i ∈ I.
We now define the ”truncated economy” as follows.
Since Xˆ i(q) and Wˆ i(q) are bounded subsets of RL and RD, respectively
(by Lemma 4.5.3), there exists a real number r > 0 such that, for every agent
i ∈ I, Xˆ i(q¯) ⊂ intBL(0, r) and Wˆ i(q¯) ⊂ intBD(0, r). The truncated economy
(Eˆr,Fr) is the collection
(Eˆr,Fr) = [D,H, I, (X ir, Pˆ ir , ei)i∈I ;J , (ξ(j), V j)j∈J , (Zir)i∈I ],
where,
X ir = X
i∩BL(0, r), Zir = {z ∈ Zi |W (q¯)z ∈ BD(0, r)} and Pˆ ir(x) = Pˆ i(x)∩intBL(0, r).
The existence of a weak equilibrium of (Eˆr,Fr) is then a consequence of Section
4.5.1, that is, Theorem 4.2.2 with the additional Assumption (K). We just have
to check that Assumption (K) and all the assumptions of Theorem 4.2.2 are
satisfied by (Eˆr,Fr). In view of Proposition 4.5.1, this is clearly the case for
all the assumptions but the Survival Assumption (C.vi) that is proved via a
standard argument (that we recall hereafter).
Indeed we first notice that (ei, 0)i∈I belongs to K(q), hence, for every
i ∈ I, ei ∈ Xˆ i(q) ⊂ intBL(0, r). Recalling that ei ∈ intX i (from the Survival
Assumption), we deduce that ei ∈ intX i ∩ intBL(0, r) ⊂ int[X i ∩ BL(0, r)] =
intX ir.
Proposition 4.5.2 Given q¯ ∈ RJ , if (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak equilibrium of (Eˆr,Fr)
then it is also a weak equilibrium of (E ,F).
68
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2. Let (x¯, z¯, p¯, q¯) be a weak equilibrium of the
economy (Eˆr,Fr). In view of the definition of a weak equilibrium, to prove
that it is also a weak equilibrium of (E ,F) we only have to check, for every
i ∈ I, [P i(x¯) × Zi] ∩ Bi(p¯, q¯) = ∅, where Bi(p¯, q¯) denotes the budget set of
agent i in the economy (E ,F).
Assume, on the contrary, that, for some i ∈ I the set [P i(x¯)×Zi]∩Bi(p¯, q¯) is
nonempty, hence contains a couple (xi, zi). Clearly the allocation (x¯,W (q¯)z¯)
belongs to the set K(q¯), hence for every i ∈ I, x¯i ∈ Xˆ i(q¯) ⊂ intBL(0, r)
and w¯i = W (q¯)z¯i ∈ Wˆ i(q¯) ⊂ int BD(0, r). Thus, for t ∈]0, 1] sufficiently
small, xi(t) := x¯i + t(xi − x¯i) ∈ intBL(0, r) and wi(t) := w¯i + t(wi − w¯i) ∈
intBD(0, r). Clearly (x
i(t), wi(t)) is such that wi(t) = W (q¯)zi(t) where zi(t) =
(z¯i + t(zi − z¯i)) ∈ Zi and (xi(t), zi(t)) belongs to the budget set Bi(p¯, q¯) of
agent i (for the economy (E ,F)) and since xi(t) ∈ X ir := X i∩BL(0, r), zi(t) ∈
Zir := {z ∈ Zi | W (q¯)z ∈ BD(0, r)}, the couple (xi(t), zi(t)) belongs also to the
budget set Bir(p¯, q¯) of agent i (in the economy (Eˆr,Fr)). From the definition
of Pˆ i, we deduce that xi(t) ∈ Pˆ i(x¯) (since from above xi(t) := x¯i + t(xi − x¯i)
and xi ∈ P i(x¯)), hence xi(t) ∈ Pˆ ir(x¯) := Pˆ i(x¯) ∩ intBL(0, r). We have thus
shown that, for t ∈]0, 1] small enough, (xi(t), zi(t)) ∈ [Pˆ ir(x¯) × Zir] ∩ Bir(p¯, q¯).
This contradicts the fact that this set is empty, since (x¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) is a weak
equilibrium of the economy (Eˆr,Fr).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Restricted participation in financial markets is more of a norm than exception
than an exception. It is thus useful and important to understand the implica-
tions of this phenomenon in a general equilibrium framework. A complete and
satisfactory analysis of the implication of such restrictions should in principle
consider these restrictions as arising endogenously. However the first and nec-
essary procedure without getting into the institutional reasons behind these
restrictions would be of impose these restrictions as a primitive describing the
agents. This procedure has been adopted in this thesis.
Limits on the capabilities of agents to process information in timely manner
may force agents to concentrate on a subset of the available assets. This is
equivalent to imposing a very special type of linear restrictions on the portfolio
sets of agents. This was the framework in Chapter 3, of this thesis. once these
restrictions have been imposed, the notion of arbitrage and its absence differs
at the individual and aggregate levels. Chapter 3, presented this difference
in a multi-period setting. The central result states that generically the set of
asset prices the do not offer arbitrage to each agent individually will be larger
than those prices that preclude arbitrage at the collective or aggregate level.
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A natural extension to this result would be to consider the case where each
agent’s portfolio set is a strict subspace of the space of all possible portfolios.
This could be associated with the situation where agent are allowed to invest
only through some mutual fund. I believe this extension should arise naturally,
however it remains to be proved.
The consequences of the difference in the notions of arbitrage at the in-
dividual and collective level in a general equilibrium setting is the subject
matter of Chapter 4. Owing to the fact that the set of prices that do not offer
arbitrage at the individual level may be too large, we proceed to show that
the set of prices that do not offer arbitrage at the aggregate level may also be
equilibrium prices. However this characterization will be possible only under
some conditions of the linear space spanned by the set of payoffs generated by
the aggregation of portfolio sets - the transfer space condition. The motivation
for the condition given in this paper (which generalizes many of the previous
conditions in the literature) arises form the conjecture of Cass [13], which was
used in the linear restrictions case.
5.1 Extensions and future research
I believe, there is still some work that is needed in completely exploring the
characterization, of equilibrium asset prices with the the asset prices that do
not offer arbitrage at the aggregate level. The counter examples in Chapter 4
work with carefully chosen endowment and preferences. Thus the robustness
of this characterization, needs to be studied in a more abstract setting.
Another confounding yet interesting result from Chapter 4 is that in or-
der weaken the definition of absence of arbitrage that is being consider for
71
the central characterization result, the corresponding transfer space condition
must be strengthened. This indicates that there are some crucial interactions
between the arbitrage opportunities and the income transfer possibilities, that
arise at the individual level versus those that arise at the aggregate level. This
issue I believe deserves further exploration in its own right. Only then can
we truly understand the implications of such restricted participation on asset
markets.
One other interesting and necessary line of inquiry would be to consider
these questions in a model with real assets. In all the analysis of this thesis,
all assets were nominal. This enabled us to analyze the financial aspect and
real aspects of the economy separately, since the asset payoffs do not depend
on spot prices. However with real assets this simplification is not possible and
could yield interesting results.
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